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ABSTRACT
The purpose of the present study was to determine the 
nature and degree of relationship between cerebral "hemis­
pheric style" and several traditional dimensions of "cogni­
tive style." A large battery of laterality preference, 
cognitive style, verbal and nonverbal ability, and selected 
additional tests was administered to 97 (52 female, 45 male) 
right-handed undergraduate volunteers, with subsequent analy­
sis of relationships among the measures by simple correlation, 
factor analysis, and multiple regression methods.
Laterality measures included the Zenhausern, Verbalizer- 
Visualizer Questionnaire, and a lateral eye movement observa­
tion measure. Data analyses utilized individual laterality 
test scores as well as a composite "laterality index." Eleven 
cognitive style tests were administered, including measures 
of field independence, distractibility, complexity, flexibility, 
and other dimensions. Additional tests administered included 
measures of verbal and visual synthesizing ability, anxiety, 
repression-sensitization, and social desirability.
The main findings of the study were as follows:
(1) intercorrelations of the cognitive style measures were 
generally very low, ranging from .00 to -.54; (2) Only one 
cognitive style factor reliably emerged, accounting for about 
10% of the common cognitive style test variance. This factor 
was called "Open vs. Closed-Mindedness" and was defined
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primarily by Dogmatism, Rigidity, and Ambiguity Tolerance 
scores; (3) Maximum multiple prediction of individual and 
composite laterality scores from individual cognitive style 
tests, cognitive style factor scores, and additional scores 
accounted for 11% to 25% of laterality variance; (4) Sex 
differences were nonsignificant on all measures with the 
following exceptions: Females performed the Stroop Test 
more quickly, were "narrower categorizers" on the Category 
Width Scale, and obtained higher trait anxiety scores than 
males.
General conclusions drawn were that hemispheric and cog­
nitive style, as measured in the present study, are largely 
unrelated, and that individuals manifest considerable diver­
sity in cognitive style. The findings caution against over­
simplification and overgeneralization in reference to both 
hemispheric and cognitive style and their interrelationship. 
Low intercorrelations of measures within both domains do call 
into question the adequacy of available tests of these con­
structs and suggest the need for further test development 
based upon current neuropsychological knowledge.
IX
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In 1950, Adorno and his associates (Adorno, Frenkel- 
Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) published The Authori­
tarian Personality. Also in that year, H. A. Witkin pub­
lished a rather brief report on a newly adapted and standard­
ized "embedded figures test," which extended previous findings 
in the area of individual differences in perception, and which 
eventuated in delineation of a perceptual style called field 
independence. And in his 1950 presidential address to the 
American Psychological Association (Guilford, 1950), Guilford 
presented his structure-of-intellect model of creativity, 
which was largely responsible for stimulating a sevenfold 
increase in creativity research over the next two decades 
(Taylor, 1975). These and other seemingly unrelated threads 
of investigation were to become interwoven approximately a 
quarter century later, upon the unlikely framework of find­
ings related principally to the brain functioning of intrac- 
tible epileptics, stroke patients and brain-injured individuals.
In the following chapter, the convergence of these 
various lines of research will be traced. The common denomi­
nator of various dimensions of cognitive control, cognitive 
style, perceptual style, certain aspects of the creative per­
sonality and process, and finally, of differential modes of 
brain hemispheric function, will be revealed as an emphasis 
upon structural individual differences in human information
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processing. Such structural models stress individual con­
sistencies in the mode or manner in which cognitive activities 
proceed; i.e., the way in which information is selected, 
organized, and processed. Structural differences are to be 
contrasted with individual consistencies in thought content, 
such as a particular set of beliefs, attitudes, memories, or 
other concepts which may influence attention deployment and 
cognition. The structural view does not deny the relevance 
of past learning (leading to such consistencies in thought 
content). However, this view does hold that structural fac­
tors will determine in part the kind of content that is pro­
cessed and retained by the individual, and moreover, that 
these structural factors can be identified and studied inde­
pendently of cognitive content variables.
During the past twenty years, neuropsychological 
studies have greatly expanded our knowledge of differential 
capacities of the two human cerebral hemispheres. While it 
had long been known that the left hemisphere is specialized 
for speech and language functions in most individuals, only 
relatively recently have two general additional insights 
been achieved: (1) that the right, so-called "minor" hemis­
phere appears to be specialized, for certain types of nonver­
bal information processing, and (2) that each hemisphere 
appears to be specialized, not only for a specific informa­
tion mode (e.g., verbal vs. nonverbal), but also in terms of
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processing mode. The verbal left hemisphere appears to be 
particularly adept at any type of task requiring sequential 
analysis, temporal discriminations, and motor sequencing-- 
all of which are clearly necessary for but not limited to 
linguistic functions. The processing mode of the right 
hemisphere, on the other hand, is of a holistic, configura­
tional, nonsequential and perhaps "intuitive" type. The 
right-hemispheric processing mode is well-suited (but again, 
not necessarily limited) to the visuo-spatial, melodic, and 
emotional tone perception and expression tasks at which it 
normally excels. The emerging neuropsychological view of 
functional hemispheric asymmetry stresses differential hemis­
pheric processing styles (analytic, linear, sequential vs. 
holistic, configurational, and parallel), with logical but 
only secondary consideration of the type of information (ver­
bal vs. nonverbal) processed most efficiently in these ways.
The neuropsychological concept of "cognitive style" is 
thus a fairly recent formulation. However, other investiga­
tors, working within other theoretical contexts, have been 
utilizing and investigating the construct of "cognitive 
style" for some time. Operationally, cognitive style has 
been measured by a variety of personality, perceptual, and 
intellectual tests— all of which purport to measure indivi­
dual differences in cognitive style (vs. ability) and struc­
ture (vs. content). The question may then naturally arise:
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What is the nature and degree of relationship between "cogni­
tive style" in the neuropsychological sense, and traditional 
measures of cognitive style? While both hemispheres of the 
normal brain are presumed to be capable of the differential 
functions described above, the neuropsychological notion of 
cognitive style suggests that individuals differ in their 
relative degree of reliance upon (or preference for) one 
hemispheric processing mode or the other. Might this "hemis­
pheric preference," or preferred style of information proces­
sing, provide an explanation at the neuropsychological level 
of observed stylistic differences in higher-order problem­
solving, cognitive-perceptual task performance, and even 
some aspects of personality functioning? Research in this 
area is far from the stage of investigating causality in 
brain-behavior relationships. However, a necessary first 
step in this direction is exploration of the degree of rela­
tionship between the variables of interest, and this is the 
major purpose of the present study.
In the chapter to follow, traditional concepts and 
measures of cognitive style will be reviewed, with particu­
lar emphasis upon those dimensions of cognitive style rele­
vant to the present study. This will be followed by an over­
view of the research related to functional brain hemispheric 
asyirmetries in both pathological and nonpathological subject 
groups. Neuropsychological findings will then be related to
the traditional cognitive style literature, with delineation 
of the purposes of the present study.
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CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
In this chapter, the general concept, historical origins 
and range of referents of the term "cognitive style," will 
be presented. This overview will include discussion of the 
issues of cognitive style vs. ability, and of value judgments 
as applied to some presumably value-free cognitive style di­
mensions. The overview will be followed by literature sur­
veys of the cognitive style dimensions of particular rele­
vance to the present study.
Next, the research demonstrating functional asymmetries 
of the human brain will be reviewed. This literature will be 
reviewed separately, for those studies involving pathological 
(e.g., unilateral brain lesions, commissurotomy or "split- 
brain" patients, unilateral focus epileptics, and psychiatric 
patients) vs. nonpathological subject groups. The theoreti­
cal rationale for relating these findings in the area of 
neuropsychology to the area of cognitive style will follow, 
with review of studies which have directly investigated this 
possible relationship between differential brain hemispheric 
function and individual differences in cognitive style.
Finally, the purposes of the present study will be 
described. The hypothesized interrelationships of the cog­
nitive style dimensions included in this study will be stated, 
as well as their expected relationships to a composite index 
of laterality.
6
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Cognitive Styles: An Overview
As Nathan Kogan (1973) has observed, "a discussion of 
the historical origins of the construct of cognitive style 
would be no less than a history of cognitive psychology" (p. 
160). This broad construct has come to subsume such diverse 
earlier constructs as "perceptual attitudes," "perceptual 
styles," "cognitive attitudes," "cognitive controls," and 
"systems principles" (Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton & 
Spence, 1959; Goldstein & Blackman, 1978). Most generally 
speaking, the notion of cognitive style is based upon the 
assumption of cognition as a mediating process between envi­
ronmental events and individual response (the S-O-R model). 
More specifically, what is common to all definitions of cog­
nitive style and its historically precedent constructs is an 
emphasis upon the structure as opposed to the content of 
thought (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978).
This structural emphasis is apparent in the following 
sample of definitions of cognitive style:
. . . the characteristic, self-consistent modes of 
functioning which individuals show in their percep­tual and intellectual activities. (Witkin, Oltman, Raskin & Karp, 1971, p. 3).
. . . a person's typical modes of perceiving, 
remembering, thinking and problem-solving.
(Messick, 1970, p. 188). . . consistent individual differences in . . . ways
of organizing and processing information and experience. 
(Messick & Associates, 1976, pp. 4-5). . . the manner in which an individual receives,
processes, and uses information. (Ragan, Back,Stansell, Ausburn, Ausburn, Butler & Huckabay, 1979, 
p. 1)
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In addition to an emphasis upon structure (and conse­
quently upon consistency and stability), the various defini­
tions also emphasize modes, ways, or manner of information 
processing— that is, an emphasis upon style as opposed to 
ability or proficiency.
Whereas the [ability domain] is concerned with level 
of performance--high (or accurate) at one extreme 
and low (or inaccurate) at the other--cognitive 
styles are purported to deal with the manner in 
which individuals acquire, store, retrieve, and 
transform information. (Kogan, 1976, p. 105)
Kogan notes that the theoretical distinction between cogni­
tive ability and style is frequently blurred in practice. 
Several tests which purport to measure cognitive "style" are 
indeed scored according to accuracy vs. inaccuracy of per­
formance. "The term style employed to designate such per­
formance may be something of a misnomer" (Kogan, 1973, p. 
161).
The appellation "style," in addition to supposedly 
connoting a variable independent of ability, also has become 
a favored term due to its implication of freedom from value 
judgment. That is, stylistic differences are presumably 
differences of type; styles do not imply distinctions of 
better or worse, good or bad, adaptive or maladaptive, except 
possibly in relation to their specific application. Yet 
again, Kogan (1973) has identified a class of cognitive 
styles which, even though not based upon veridicality of 
performance, are nevertheless consistently valued more at
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one pole than the other of the dimension. In practice, it 
is a small class of cognitive styles indeed for which matters 
of veridicality are irrelevant and to which no value judg­
ments are assigned. "These are the cognitive styles that 
are most purely stylistic" (Kogan, 1973, p. 161). And even 
in these cases, interpretive controversy is lively (espe­
cially, it seems, when sex differences are involved), creating 
the impression of a struggle to impose differential valuing 
of the poles even when evidence is lacking to do so (cf.
Bieri, 1969).
Cognitive style research, then, is far from a "value- 
free study of cognition," as it is typically characterized. 
While current investigators may prefer to adopt a neutral, 
nonjudgmental frame of reference (particularly those operating 
from a neuropsychological perspective which accepts relative 
superiority of each brain hemisphere in the performance of 
different functions), a brief consideration of the theoreti­
cal frameworks from which traditional tests of cognitive 
style were formulated will reveal the reasons for value 
biases. Tests of dogmatism, ambiguity tolerance, and rigidity 
evolved from study of the authoritarian personality (Adorno 
et al. , 1950). While these tests were attempts to separate 
the structural aspects of authoritarianism from any particular 
ideology (e.g., fascism and anti-Semitism), the fact that any 
such structural component was believed to lead to "antidemo­
cratic" attitudes and behavior provides an obvious basis for
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the greater valuing of particular poles of the dimensions. 
Also, workers in this area were psychoanalytically oriented, 
so that there were theoretical as well as political reasons 
to favor the more flexible, tolerant and nondogmatic indivi­
dual. These characteristics were interpreted to be consistent 
with a less rigid defensive psychological makeup and relative 
freedom from underlying intrapsychic conflict.
Conceptual differentiation and constricted-flexible 
control, as well as tolerance for unrealistic experiences, 
leveling-sharpening, and focusing, were originally termed 
"cognitive controls" and "control principles." These vari­
ables were conceived and studied at the Menninger Foundation 
by Gardner and his associates (1959) within an ego-psycho- 
analytic theoretical framework. The "control" terminology 
reflects the theoretical postulate of ego control; the ego 
psychology viewpoint is revealed in the group's emphasis 
upon "conflict-free" functions and upon adaptation:
The possibility that "conflict-free" cognitive 
functions are idiosyncratically organized in 
individuals has not yet been explored by psycho­
analysis. It is precisely in this respect that the concept of cognitive control, with its pro­
vision for adaptively adequate yet various modes of encountering reality, may prove a useful addition 
to the theory. (Gardner et al., 1959, p. 9)
Again, despite the reference to "adaptively adequate yet
various" modes, the underlying theory requires some degree
of differential valuing of the dimensional extremes. For
example, flexible control is clearly more effective and
adaptive than constricted control (as measured by the degree
11
of susceptibility to interference). Similarly, individuals 
low in conceptual differentiation, and those more inclined 
toward "leveling" in memory organization, function at a more 
primitive developmental level in these areas, according to 
the theory.
Field independence (and the related dimensions of 
impulsivity-reflection and distractibility) has roots in 
developmental, perceptual (Gestalt) and psychoanalytic theory. 
From any and all of these orientations, the individual capable 
of more precise field articulation and perceptual disembedding 
is also theoretically the more advanced and mature. This view 
is supported by evidence which indicates a general increase 
in field independence through childhood to young adulthood 
(Witkin et al., 1971). Similarly, cognitive complexity-- 
whether of the type based upon Kelly's (1955) personal con­
structs theory or upon the conceptual systems theory of 
Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder (1961),— is regarded as a more 
sophisticated state of development than cognitive simplicity. 
Although Kogan has remarked that "psychologists concerned 
with individual differences very likely score at the complex 
end of a complexity vs. simplicity dimension" (1976, p. 98), 
it seems likely that complexity is valued more on theoretical 
than personal grounds.
The previous discussion reveals that different dimensions 
of cognitive styles have been developed from diverse (although 
predominantly ego-psychological) theoretical orientations.
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Thus there exists no commonly accepted, well-defined and 
theoretically integrated set of cognitive styles. The present 
review led to identification of over twenty proposed dimen­
sions of cognitive style, but major reviewers usually limit 
discussion to nine or ten of the most well-known (Goldstein 
& Blackman, 1978; Kogan, 1971; Messick, 1970; Ragan et al., 
1979). Messick's 1976 review, however, included discussion 
of eighteen. Automated computer searches which were com­
pleted for a recent review of the cognitive style literature 
yielded approximately 3500 citations (Back, Stansell, Ragan, 
Ausburn, Ausburn, & Huckabay, 1979). Certainly this is a 
domain of lively research interest, although one remarkably 
lacking in integration (cf. Goldstein & Blackman, 1978).
For purposes of the present study, a large number 
(ideally, all) of the cognitive style dimensions identified 
to date were to be measured. However, selection of a subset 
of representative cognitive style tests was necessitated by 
the following factors: (a) meaningful statistical analysis
imposed some constraints upon the number of measures to be 
included, given sample size limitations; (b) available tests 
needed to meet some semblance of psychometric soundness and 
also needed to be a commonly accepted measure of the dimen­
sion in question. In addition, the relative ease and speed 
of administration were considered, as well as nonaversiveness 
of the measures. This last consideration ruled out inclusion 
of either of two tests of leveling-sharpening (a variable of
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some interest) because subjects reportedly find both of these 
lengthy measures to be "quite monotonous . . . fatiguing and
boring" (Gardner et al. , 1959, p. 18). Given these con­
straints, measures were obtained for each subject on eleven 
cognitive style dimensions. These dimensions, and the tests 
utilized to measure them, are individually reviewed below.
Dogmatism
Dogmatism, or "closed-mindedness," is "(a) a relatively 
closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about 
reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about 
absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework 
for patterns of intolerance toward others" (Rokeach, 1954, 
p. 195). Rokeach emphasized the structural aspect of dog­
matism, independent of any specific set of beliefs, and thus 
differentiated it from other measures of authoritarianism 
such as the original Fascism (F) scale of Adorno and his 
associates (1950). This structural emphasis classifies dog­
matism as one of the earliest dimensions of cognitive style.
The Rokeach Dogmatism Scale was revised four times.
The final revision, Form E, has 40 items (Rokeach, 1960) and 
is most often used in research. Reliability is generally 
high for adult and high school populations, with the Dogma­
tism scale achieving a test-retest correlation coefficient 
of .55 even over a five-year interval (Vacchiano, Strauss,
& Hochman, 1969). The scale is apparently unaffected by a
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social desirability response bias (Becker & DiLio, 1967; 
Bernhardson, 1967; Wolfer, 1967).
The research literature has been supportive of the 
central proposition of Rokeach, that dogmatic persons are 
highly resistant to change (Ehrlich & Lee, 1969). High- 
dogmatics (HD) make more errors in learning new word-pairs 
than low-dogmatics (LD). They rate novel musical systems 
(e.g., Schonberg as opposed to Brahms) more negatively than 
low-dogmatics. In fact, across three media (painting, music,
and literature), high-dogmatics like popular art significantly/
more than classical art, and classical art significantly more 
than avant-garde (whereas LD subjects appear to like all 
esthetics equally well). In a simulated bargaining game, 
regardless of assigned role as union or management represen­
tative, high-dogmatics were more resistant to compromise than 
LD counterparts, resolved fewer issues and were more likely 
to view compromise as defeat. HD psychiatric patients are 
hospitalized longer than LD psychiatric patients, possibly a 
consequence of greater resistance to change (Ehrlich & Lee, 
1969 ) .
Relationships of dogmatism to other personality scales 
also indicate relative cognitive inflexibility and change 
resistance (Vacchiano et al., 1969). Higher dogmatism is 
associated with lower tolerance, flexibility and security 
on the California Psychological Inventory, with higher need 
for Succorance and lower needs for Change and Intraception
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on the Edwards Personal Preference Inventory, and with con­
formity, restraint and conservatism on the 16PF test. Addi­
tional studies reviewed by Goldstein and Blackman (1978) 
showed significant positive correlations of dogmatism to 
Intolerance of Ambiguity as measured by both Budner (1962) 
and MacDonald (1970), and with the Gough (1975) Rigidity scale.
Dogmatism has been positively related to anxiety and 
with various degrees of maladjustment as measured by the 
16PF, the Mooney Problem Checklist, the Personal Orientation 
Inventory and MMPI Scales, F, K, D, Pt, and Si (Vacchiano et 
al., 1969). Two studies reviewed by Vacchiano and others 
showed dogmatism to be associated with sensitizing rather 
than repressing defenses on the Repression-Sensitization 
scale. This finding seems to conflict with another study they 
reviewed showing high positive correlations of dogmatism with 
denial, and high negative correlations with depression, in a 
group of 32 males who were gradually losing their sight. 
Despite the positive correlations of dogmatism with various 
measures of psychopathology, two different studies did not 
reveal any relation between school counselor dogmatism and 
effectiveness, and dogmatism was positively correlated with 
a measure of adaptive regression in a group of creative 
artists (Vacchiano et al., 1969).
The review of Goldstein and Blackman (1978) also in­
cluded evidence that, as expected, high-dogmatics have been 
shown to be more influenced by authority than low-dogmatics
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in a number of studies. Two studies indicated that dogmatism 
affects judgment accuracy as well: low-dogmatics are able to 
judge the dogmatism level of others more accurately than high- 
dogmatics !
Results have been more equivocal in the area of percep­
tual correlates of a dogmatic cognitive style (Goldstein & 
Blackman, 1978; Vacchiano et al., 1969). High- and low-dog­
matics consistently differ in synthesizing ability (as measured 
by Block Designs) but not in analytic ability (as measured by 
the Embedded Figures Test). However, interesting interaction 
effects have been noted and summarized by Vacchiano and others
(1969) :
It would appear that the influence of dogmatism (as 
a cognitive style) upon perceptual functioning is 
limited. The hypothesis that dogmatism and field dependence are unrelated can be fairly well supported. Perceptual synthesis, though, seems to be a function 
of both dependency and dogmatism. Field-dependent- 
HD groups have the most difficulty with synthesizing; 
field-independent-LD's, the least. (p. 266)
Some of the inconsistent findings noted above may be due 
in part to the relatively statistically "impure" nature of 
Rokeach's Form E Dogmatism Scale. Steininger and Lesser 
(1974) compared five factor-analytic studies of the Dogmatism 
scale and selected the 15 items which consistently emerged (13 
items in four or five studies, two items in two studies). The 
resulting 15-item scale correlated from .86 to .92 (£ < .01) 
with the original scale's total score for four different sub­
ject groups. Although prior studies have shown high-dogmatics
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to more likely be rightist in political orientation (e.g., 
Karabenick & Wilson, 1969), Steininger and Lesser found dog­
matism to be unrelated to conservatism-liberalism, possibly 
because they studied nonstudent as well as student groups.
Ambiguity Tolerance and Rigidity
The related dimensions of ambiguity tolerance and cogni­
tive rigidity, like dogmatism, emerged from studies of the 
authoritarian personality in the late 1940's. They also were 
the result of theoretical efforts to isolate content-inde­
pendent, structural individual differences which could account 
for prejudice and ethnocentrism, including but not limited to 
the phenomenon of fascism.
Based on her studies of ethnic prejudice at the Insti­
tute of Child Welfare at the University of California, Else 
Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) described the emergence of her con­
cept of ambiguity intolerance as follows:
Starting from the observation that some of her sub­
jects were able to tolerate emotional ambiguities 
better than others, the writer became involved in 
the question of whether this attitude of intolerance of more complex, conflicting, or otherwise open 
structures extends beyond the emotional and social areas to further include perceptual and cognitive aspects proper. (p. 114)
Perceptually, Frenkel-Brunswik found ambiguity intolerance 
to be related to a "prolonged clinging to the first impres­
sion" (p. 129), and cognitively, to difficulty in changing 
mental set on both a verbal arithmetic and spatial task. It 
also appeared to be related to a reluctance to think in terms
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of probabilities in a probability-learning task.
Frenkel-Brunswik, writing from a psychoanalytic orien­
tation, believed that "rigidity of attitudes constitutes a 
counterbalance to underlying conflicts often verging on chaos" 
(p. 132), and she also noted the relevance of parental influ­
ence upon the formation of this cognitive style:
Data on the parents of the children in the rigid, 
intolerant group reveal that it is their feeling of 
social and economic marginality in relation to the 
group to which they aspire from which ensues the 
desperate clinging to external and rigid rules . . .
It is this rigid adherence to norm which furnishes 
the key to an understanding of all the various 
avoidances of ambiguities listed in this paper.
(pp. 118-119)
Early attempts to develop an independent scale of ambi­
guity tolerance were not successful. Goldstein and Blackman 
(1978) report that a 1958 review of twelve different measures 
of ambiguity tolerance was discouraging: Of the 66 inter­
correlations, only seven were significant, and of these seven, 
two were in the wrong direction. A more promising scale, by 
Budner (1962), was questioned by MacDonald (1970) on the 
basis of its high correlation with another measure of ambi­
guity tolerance with a demonstrated internal consistency of 
.08. Budner's scale had, however, shown a degree of validity 
by correlating in expected fashion with conventionality, 
belief in a divine power, church attendance, dogmatism about 
one's religious beliefs, and attitudes with authoritarianism 
and expressed attitudes of idealization of and submission to 
parents.
Rydell and Rosen (1966) constructed an ambiguity tolerance
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scale with a test-retest reliability of .71 (one month) and 
.57 (two months). MacDonald (1970) increased the length of 
the Rydell and Rosen scale from 16 to 20 items, thereby 
increasing its split-half reliability in his sample from 
.64 to .86; his retest reliability was estimated at .63 (p
< .01) for a six-month interval. The MacDonald scale of 
ambiguity tolerance correlated positively with performance 
on a complex Scrambled Words test (r = .33, p < .01), and 
negatively with authoritarianism (the F Scale) (r = -.30, p
< .01), Rokeach Dogmatism (r = -.42, p < .01), Gough Rigidity 
(r = -.41, p < .01), and church attendance (r = -.24, p < 
.01). It was unrelated to Marlowe-Crowne social desirability 
response bias (r = .02). Goldstein and Blackman (1978) re­
gard the MacDonald scale as one of the most promising scales 
of ambiguity tolerance, and this was the measure utilized
in the present study.
Rigidity is related to ambiguity tolerance, both theore­
tically and empirically, and yet most researchers in the area 
take some pains to distinguish them. Cognitive rigidity is 
defined as "a continuation of former behavior patterns when 
a change in the situation requires a change in behavior for 
more efficient functioning" (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978, pp. 
39-40), whereas intolerance of ambiguity is "the unwarranted 
imposition of structure when the situation is unstructured" 
(p. 40). Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) used the terms inter­
changeably .
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As in the case of ambiguity tolerance, many early measures 
of rigidity were all independent (uncorrelated). However, the 
Gough Rigidity scale (1975) has become commonly accepted as 
the criterion measure and presently constitutes the Flexi­
bility subscale of the California Psychological Inventory 
(Gough, 1975), scored in reverse. Gough (1975) reports one- 
year test-retest reliabilities of .67 and .60 for high school 
female and male samples, respectively, and a 7 to 21 day test- 
retest reliability of .49 for male prisoners. MacDonald
(1970) reports a six-month test-retest reliability of .57 (p 
< .01) for the Gough scale, with a sample of male undergradu­
ates. The validity of the scale is demonstrated by its corre­
lations, when scored in the direction of flexibility, of -.48 
with staff ratings of "rigidity" of graduate students, -.36 
with staff ratings of "rigidity" of medical school seniors, 
and -.58 with F-scale (authoritarianism) scores of college 
undergraduates (Gough, 1975). As reported earlier, MacDonald 
(1970) reported a correlation of -.41 (p < .01) between Gough 
Rigidity and his ambiguity tolerance scale.
Since the MacDonald scale accounts for about 17% of the 
variance in Rigidity scores, it is clear that the dimensions 
are related but not identical. Therefore, the Gough Rigidity 
scale was included in the present study.
Origence-Intellectance
In 1947, George Welsh constructed a 200-item nonverbal 
figure preference test to diagnose psychopathology. Factor
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analysis revealed a simplicity/symmetry vs. complexity/asym- 
metry factor. Subsequently, an expanded (400-item) version 
of the test was administered to a sample of 37 artists and 
art students, and a group of 150 nonartists. A 65-item scale 
was empirically derived to reliably differentiate the artists, 
who tended to prefer the complex items, from nonartists, who 
tended to prefer the simple, symmetrical items. Hence the 
scale came to be known as the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron, 
1952; Barron & Welsh, 1952). In attempting to interpret the 
results, Barron and Welsh (1 952) suggested that artists may 
favor certain principles of composition, or they may resemble 
one another in personality. "Or, again, there may exist some 
higher-order determinant of both artistic taste and person­
ality style, with both of the lower-order variables having 
found expression in these test scores" (p. 201). Subsequent 
studies with the Art Scale tended to support the notion of 
complexity-simplicity preference as a personality dimension 
(Barron, 1953a, 1953b). Figural complexity preference con­
sistently related positively to personal tempo, verbal 
fluency, impulsiveness, expansiveness, and "breakdown of 
repression," among other variables and consistently negatively 
to rigidity and constriction, impulse control by repression, 
politico-economic conservatism, subservience to authority, 
ethnocentrism, and social conformity (Barron, 1953a). Also, 
"Independents" as identified in an experiment planned and 
conducted by Solomon Asch, were found to prefer the complex Art
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Scale figures to a significantly greater extent than "Yielders" 
(p. < .01). Thus complex figure preference was also shown to 
be related to independence of judgment in a peer-pressure 
situation (Barron, 1953b) .
Thus from a measure originally designed to be a psycho­
diagnostic tool came a scale with ever-increasing generality.
It has continued to be used frequently as a criterion measure 
in studies of artistic creativity (see Welsh, 1975, pp. 60- 
69 and 205-227, for an extensive review). However, even the 
early studies described above revealed cognitive dimensions 
(and obvious perceptual dimensions, by the nature of the 
scale) which may be important structural determinants of 
test performance. Also, the Art Scale is a genuine preference 
(vs. ability) test, and as such it is indisputably a measure 
of style as opposed to aptitude (cf. Kogan, 1973).
Welsh (1980) developed "Origence" (WOR) and "Intellec- 
tance" (WIN) subscales of the full-length, 400-item Welsh 
Figure Preference Test (WFPT) to supplant two earlier forms 
of the Art Scale. WOR and WIN were empirically derived from 
the WFPT responses of gifted adolescents grouped on the two 
dimensions on the basis of personality and vocational 
interest test scores. WOR correlates highly with the 
original Art Scale (r = .95), due in part to a substantial 
item overlap in the scales. Low WOR scorers "prefer and are 
more at home in an explicit and well-defined world which can 
be grasped by the application of objective rules" (Welsh,
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1980, p. 26), while high WOR scores "find congenial an 
implicit and open universe which they can structure in their 
own subjective way" (p. 26). Intellectance (WIN) is con­
ceptualized as a concrete vs. abstract dimension. "The 
dimensions are conceptually independent and the scales are 
statistically uncorrelated but are most useful when scored 
and interpreted conjointly" (p. 10).
Welsh characterizes the High Origence-Low Intellectance 
individual as a non-conforming, impulsive, extratensive 
"imaginative type," often interested in artistic, literary 
and esthetic matters. Conversely, the Low Origence-High 
Intellectance scorer is interpreted as a conventional, logi­
cal, introversive "intellectual type," who tends to score 
higher on standard IQ tests. Although the model also gener­
ates two additional categories in the typology (High Origence- 
High Intellectance "Intuitive Type" and Low Origence-Low 
Intellectance "Industrious Type"), only the first two types 
are relevant to the present study.
Welsh (1980) notes that, since the WOR dimension can be 
measured by the original Art Scale, earlier studies utilizing 
the latter can be interpreted in the framework of his newer, 
two-dimensional model. Thus, the studies reviewed above 
which involve the Art Scale showing figural complexity pre­
ference to positively correlate with personal tempo, verbal 
fluency, impulsivity, and nonrepression, and to negatively 
correlate with cognitive rigidity, conservatism, conformity
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and repression are of relevance. Also, in a small explora­
tory study conducted by the writer (Kuchler, Note 1) with 
twelve female undergraduates, Barron-Welsh Art Scale scores 
were found to correlate positively with cognitive flexibility 
(the Gough Rigidity scale scored in reverse; r = .64, £ <
.02) and negatively with Spielberger Trait Anxiety (r = -.58, 
£ < .04). Art Scale scores were unrelated to Spielberger 
State Anxiety, before or after administration of a modified, 
group Rorschach measure. On the Rorschach, Art Scale scores 
correlated significantly negatively with common detail (D) 
responses (r = -.60, £ < .03), with Pure Form Accuracy (F +
%; r = -.63, £ <  .02) and with overall Form Accuracy (X + %; 
r = -.78, £ < .002).
Field Independence
Whereas the related cognitive styles of dogmatism, 
ambiguity tolerance and rigidity emerged from studies of 
authoritarianism, and origence and intellectance have their 
roots in creative personality research, field independence 
properly refers to a perceptual style first identified in 
experimental studies of space orientation and perception of 
body position within different visual fields.
Witkin (1950) found that individual differences relating 
to how strongly one was affected by the surrounding visual 
field in such studies could be generalized to a perceptual 
disembedding task. The underlying stylistic dimension was
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conceived as a narrowly perceptual one and was called field
independence vs. field dependence:
In a field-dependent mode of perceiving, perception 
is strongly dominated by the overall organization 
of the surrounding field, and parts of the field are experienced as "fused." In a field-independent 
mode of perceiving, parts of the field are ex­
perienced as discrete from organized ground.
(Witkin et al., 1971, p. 4)
Extensive subsequent research into the nature and corre­
lates of field independent-dependent perceptual styles 
(Witkin, Dyk, Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962) revealed 
that the dimension extended further, into the cognitive 
domain. Field-dependent (FD) persons tended to do less 
well in solving problems which required isolation of an 
essential element from its original context, and its utili­
zation in a new and different context. Hence the perceptual 
style of field independence-dependence was conceptually sub­
sumed under the broader cognitive style of analytic vs. 
global (Witkin et al., 1971). "What is basically at issue 
in this cognitive style is extent of ability to overcome an 
embedding context" (Witkin et al., 1971, p. 7). When further 
study revealed a link between analytical and structuring 
ability (e.g., ability to impose structure upon inkblots 
with resultant percepts that are organized and definite as 
opposed to vague and indefinite), the presumed underlying 
cognitive style was broadened again in scope and renamed 
articulated vs. global (Witkin et al., 1962).
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The articulated-global dimension of cognitive style 
was in turn subsumed theoretically under an even broader 
psychological dimension called level of psychological 
differentiation. This further generalization was made on 
the basis of studies showing the articulated-global cognitive 
style to relate to (1) body concept (degree of detail, realis­
tic proportion, clarity of sex and role representation in 
human figure drawings); (2) sense of separate identity (aware­
ness of one's own needs, feelings, and attitudes as opposed 
to reliance on external sources for self-definition); and 
(3) nature of psychological defenses (specialized, e.g., 
isolation, vs. nonspecialized, e.g., repression or denial) 
(Witkin et al., 1962). "Differentiation refers to the com­
plexity of structure of a psychological system" (Witkin et 
al., 1971, p. 10). At any level of differentiation, Witkin 
notes, various modes and levels of integration are possible, 
and psychological adjustment is more a function of the effec­
tiveness of an individual's integration than of differentia­
tion per se.
Witkin and Goodenough (1976a, 1976b) recently modified 
the theory of psychological differentiation. Based upon the 
vast accumulated literature, they now divide differentiation 
into three main subsections: segregation of psychological . 
functions (body concept, defense mechanisms, and control 
over impulse expression), segregation of neurophysical 
functions (to be discussed below in the section, "Laterality
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and Cognitive Style"), and self-nonself segregation. Two 
subsections of self-nonself segregation are autonomy in 
interpersonal relationships and restructuring ability. While 
the influences of psychoanalytic theory, Werner's organismic 
theory of development, Lewin's field theory, and Gestalt 
principles can all be seen, the cognitive style dimension of 
Witkin and his associates presently fits clearly within their 
own developed theory of psychological differentiation.
From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that the 
correct designation of the cognitive style dimension of 
Witkin and his associates is either analytic-global or 
articulated-global. However, the field independence-depen­
dence terminology has been retained in the present study in 
order to most clearly reflect (and emphasize) the perceptual 
nature of the criterion measure, the Group Embedded Figures 
Test. Also, the term "analytic" is ambiguous, since it has 
been used to describe an unrelated form of conceptualizing 
style (Kagan, Moss & Sigel, 1963). Similarly, "articulation" 
is a term easily confused with "conceptual articulation," 
which refers to cognitive complexity in the sense used by 
Kelly ( 1955).
Operationally, field independence (FI) and field de­
pendence (FD) have been defined as performance on any of 
several accepted (and well-intercorrelated) tests: The Rod- 
and-Frame Test (RFT), the Body Adjustment Test (BAT), the 
Hidden Figures Test (HFT), the Embedded Figures Test (EFT),
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and several alternative children's and group forms, including 
the Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT). Of a variety of 
group EFT instruments, the GEFT used in the present study 
(achromatic, requiring memory) correlates most highly with 
the original, individually administered EFT (r = .84), which 
in turn has repeatedly demonstrated reliability in the low 
nineties (Jackson, Messick, & Myers, 1964). Witkin et al.
(1971) report a split-half GEFT reliability of .82 for both 
males and females, and a concurrent validity with the parent 
EFT of -.82 for males and -.63 for females when the tests 
are scored in reverse fashion.
Witkin et al. (1971) vigorously maintain that field
independence is independent of IQ, except for artifactual 
correlations with overall IQ produced by actual association 
with the relevant "analytic triad" of Picture Completion, 
Block Design and Object Assembly of the Wechsler scales. 
Nevertheless, significant positive correlations of FI with 
verbal ability measures (e.g., Wachtel, 1968; cf. Kogan,
1973) are not rare, and their absence cannot be assumed.
Field independent individuals appear to be less vul­
nerable to interference on the Stroop test (Bone & Eysenck, 
1972; Messick & Fritzky, 1963) and less impulsive (Massari, 
1975; Willoughby, 1967). Field independence appears un­
related to number of categories created in a sorting task 
(Gardner et al., 1959) and to dogmatism, rigidity and 
ambiguity tolerance (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978; Messick &
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Fritzky, 1963).
Cross-sectional developmental studies indicate that 
field independence increases from about age 8 to 15, levels 
off in young adulthood, and diminishes in older age, with 
the decline beginning in the late 30's (Witkin et al., 1971). 
Longitudinal data are also available for individuals between 
the ages of 8 and 24, which demonstrates the stability of 
subjects' standing on the variable relative to age peers 
(r = .48 to .92) (Kogan, 1973). Kogan (1973) noted that the 
studies which indicated more field dependence among the 
elderly, and more field dependence of retired elderly rela­
tive to employed elderly, were uncontrolled for educational 
level, whereas a study which did control for years of educa­
tion showed no difference in field independence between 
institutionalized vs. noninstitutionalized elderly. He 
suggested that education rather than age constitutes the 
major determinant of observed differences between younger 
and older groups, and between retired and employed older 
persons.
Just as Witkin and his associates may overstate the 
case a bit in regard to developmental changes in field inde­
pendence and its lack of association with verbal ability, his 
definite statements about sex differences (with males con­
sistently regarded as more field independent) may require 
further qualification over time. The writer has noted several 
studies (Kuchler, Note 2) in which no sex differences in
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field independence, or sex differences favoring females, 
have been found. In their validational study of a variety 
of forms of the EFT, Jackson, Messick and Myers (1964) re­
ported:
In sharp contrast to a wealth of data indicating 
faster and more accurate EFT performance among 
males . . . significant sex differences did not
appear in the present sample for any of the EFT's, not even for the Witkin items administered indi­
vidually. (p. 185)
Using the HFT as the criterion of field independence, 
Willoughby (1967) found no sex differences on the dimension. 
Kogan (1976) notes that "sex differences in cognitive func­
tioning have been steadily declining" (p. 97) and that "the 
case for sex differences in cognitive styles and abilities 
may have been overstated" (pp. 118-119). While the actual 
current relationship of sex and field independence will only 
be determined as the evidence accumulates, the "striking" 
sex differences reported by Witkin et al. in the 1950's 
cannot be assumed to be evident in current samples of males 
and females.
Field independence as traditionally measured is clearly 
an ability dimension as opposed to a truly stylistic dimen­
sion, as these were distinguished by Kogan (1973). This 
distinction was anticipated by Wachtel (1968), who compared 
analytic conceptualizing style as measured by a free sorting 
task (Kagan, Moss & Sigel, 1963) with analytic "style" as 
measured by the EFT. Wachtel found no relationship between
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the two. He noted that the EFT requires the subject to be
analytical and thus analytic capacity is measured, whereas
the sorting task may reflect a genuine stylistic preference.
The extremely field-independent individual has 
available to him a highly analytic mode of func­
tioning . . . Whether an available mode of func­
tioning is utilized almost exclusively or only in 
particular situations may itself represent an 
important stylistic variable. (p. 209)
Witkin et al. (1971) also express interest in the field- 
independent individual who always functions in field-indepen­
dent fashion and the one who may or may not choose to do so. 
They appeal to Werner's (1957) concept of mobility vs. 
fixity to account for the difference.
A final issue of importance relevant to the field 
independence-dependence concept is the matter of differential 
valuing of the extremes of the "styles." As Kogan (1973) 
noted, the "purest" of style dimensions do not have value 
judgments associated with their poles. Witkin et al. (1971) 
assert that psychological maladjustment is a function of 
integration, not of differentiation, and that the adaptive 
value of differentiation depends on the setting (e.g., 
cultural or cultural subgroup expectations) and upon the 
occupation of the individual. Despite all these qualifiers, 
their bias in valuing field independence more highly than 
field dependence appears to emerge in statements such as the 
following:
A more field-independent mode of performing the 
EFT is conceived as reflecting more developed
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cognitive functioning (p. 10) . . .On the quite 
specific ground that it involves "fulfillment of 
the organism's potential," achievement of complex 
structure or greater differentiation is, within 
limits, to be valued over fixation at a more rudi­
mentary level (p. 12) . . . Maturity, as commonlyconceived, connotes both developmental differen­
tiation and effective integration. (p. 13)
Thus in Witkin's view, the notion of a mature field dependent 
individual is incongruous. Kogan (1971) noted that despite 
"lip service to a value-free study of cognition," field 
independence is clearly considered a more mature and adaptive 
mode of functioning. Explicit training efforts are typi­
cally in the direction of making people more field independent. 
"Not much is said about enhancing field dependence through 
training or of capitalizing upon the positive qualities of 
field-dependent individuals" (p. 252). The accumulated 
research shows field-dependent individuals to be superior 
to field-independent individuals in memory of social words 
and memory for faces, and they require less time to reach a 
group concensus.
There is now a good deal of evidence that these 
individuals are more sensitive to social stimuli 
than are field-independent persons . . . One may, 
in fact, legitimately claim that a cognitive style 
facilitating fine articulation and sensitivity to the social environment is for many purposes more highly adaptive than a style contributing to a 
better articulation of the physical setting.(Kogan, 1971, p. 253).
Ragan et al. (1979) also point out that:
Learning and performance of other jobs where inter­
personal skills assume increased importance may be difficult for the field-independent person. Such 
jobs as teaching, law enforcement, and personnel
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management may rely upon the abilities of the field- 
dependent cognitive style. (p. 12)
Regardless of its technical classification as an ability 
or style dimension and the issue of possible overvaluation 
of one of its poles, field independence-dependence is a 
variable of considerable interest in the present study. 
Because it is undoubtedly the most widely researched of 
cognitive styles, a wealth of literature is available for 
the present and continuing consideration of results. Also, 
it has been the subject of several studies directly issuing 
from a laterality model, to be discussed below.
Distractibility: Types A and B
Stephen Karp, a long-term associate of Witkin, published 
a factor analytic study in 1963 (Karp, 1963) which convinc­
ingly demonstrated that the ability to overcome the effects 
of distracting contexts can be distinguished from the ability 
to overcome effects of embedding contexts. Karp described 
the differences in the two types of tasks as follows:
With regard to the embedding context, each part of the simple figure has also been used as part of a different configuration. These configurations 
serve to "break up" the simple figure, by embedding its parts in other, more compelling, gestalts. In 
contrast, the distracting context . . . leaves the 
[figure] intact, although surrounded by considerable 
extraneous material. (Karp, 1962, p. 1)
Karp factor-analyzed six tests with distracting contexts 
along with three tests of field dependence (EFT, RFT, and 
BAT) and nine other measures, including several WAIS sub­
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tests. He extracted eight factors, and found that while 
four of his distraction measures were highly loaded (.48 to 
.61) on Factor 2 ("Overcoming Distracting Contexts"), none 
of them loaded on the "Analytic Ability (overcoming embedded­
ness)" Factor 1, which was defined primarily by EFT, RFT, and 
BAT, all with Factor 1 loadings in the seventies. WAIS 
Vocabulary did not load on either of these factors. However, 
it is interesting to note that WAIS Block Design and Object 
Assembly had moderate loadings on the embeddedness factor, 
and WAIS Digit Symbol loaded on the distraction factor.
Karp's Arithmetic Operations (AO) test had the highest 
loading of all his distraction tests on the distraction 
factor, and this was the test utilized in the present study 
as a measure of Distractibility (Type A). Karp interpreted 
this factor as "involving ability to manipulate or locate 
items surrounded by a matrix of irrelevant items which serve 
to distract the subject from performance on the task" (1962, 
p. 6). The nature of the AO task is described in more 
detail in the Methods section to follow.
Traditionally, however, the most frequently used measure 
of distractibility is the Stroop Color-Word Test (Stroop, 
1935; cf. Ragan et al., 1979). The Stroop was used as a 
measure of "constricted vs. flexible control" by Gardner and 
his associates (1959), who noted an apparent similarity of 
this dimension to Witkin's field dependence-independence 
dimension. In the Gardner et al. study, Stroop interference
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scores did indeed correlate significantly (r = .54, £ < .01) 
with field dependence for his female sample, although the 
correlation coefficient reported for males (.21) is not 
significant, considering his sample size (n = 30). Santo- 
stefano (1969) theoretically combined the constricted-flexible 
control principle and the field dependence-independence con­
struct and called the superordinate construct "field arti­
culation. "
The question remained, however, of the empirical rela­
tionship between field independence and the two types of 
distraction measures (Karp's tests and the Stroop). Two 
subsequent factor analytic studies (Bone & Eysenck, 1972;
Sack & Rice, 1974) replicated and extended Karp's (1962) 
findings, by showing the distractibility and field indepen­
dence tests to load on different factors, and the Stroop 
interference measure to load primarily on a third factor in 
each case. Sack and Rice called the Stroop factor "shifting," 
defined as "a voluntary change in an established attentional 
focus" (p. 1005). In the present study, the cognitive style 
variable operationally defined by the Stroop test is called 
Distractibility (Type B). The nature of the Stroop test is 
described in the Methods section below.
Reflection-Impulsivity
Jerome Kagan is well-known to developmental psycholo­
gists for his important infant and infant-mother studies as
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well as the famous 30-year longitudinal Fels study. He is 
also a major figure in the area of educational psychology 
due to his research focus upon problem-solving behavior of 
children. While his contributions are thus primarily within 
cognitive-developmental fields, his attention to personality 
variables as well gives his perspective an unusually broad 
quality. His work has been called "at once connectionist 
and cognitive, humanistic and behavioral" (Galloway, 1976,
p. 182).
Kagan's identification of a reflective-impulsive cogni­
tive style dimension was associated with his studies of 
children's problem-solving behavior. He describes the 
dimension as follows:
The reflection-impulsivity dimension describes the degree to which a subject reflects upon the differ­
ential validity of alternative solution hypotheses 
in situations where many response possibilities are 
available simultaneously. In these problem situations 
the subjects with fast tempo impulsively report the 
first hypothesis that occurs to them, and this re­
sponse is typically incorrect. The reflective sub­
ject on the other hand, delays a long time before 
reporting a solution hypothesis and is usually 
correct. (Kagan, 1966, p. 119)
Massari (1975) simplifies the definition of reflection- 
impulsivity to "the degree to which a person evaluates the 
possible solution alternatives in situations of high response 
uncertainty" (p. 61).
Reflection-impulsivity is measured by Kagan's Matching 
Familiar Figures Test (MFFT), in which the subject must 
select the exact duplicate of a given standard stimulus from
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an array of variants. The examinee is scored for both latency 
of initial responses and total number of errors made before 
the correct match is made. Reliability of the MFFT is low to 
moderate (Ragan et al., 1979), and yet the MFFT correlates 
.40 and upward with a variety of tasks involving response 
uncertainty (Kagan, Rosman, Day, Albert & Phillips, 1964; 
Kogan, 1971). Sex differences do not invariably appear, but 
when they do, the difference is in the direction of females 
being more reflective (Messer, 1976).
Reflectives are significantly more field independent 
than impulsives. In six studies reviewed by Messer (1976), 
the correlations of MFFT latency score with the EFT ranged 
from .18 to .38, while MFFT error score correlated with the 
EFT from -.35 to -.62. However, it is important to note that 
these studies (just as the reliability and validity studies 
reviewed) exclusively involved children as subjects. In the 
case of the studies of impulsivity-field dependence, the age 
of subjects ranged from 3 years, 9 months to 14 years. The 
relationship of MFFT and EFT scores in adults is unknown.
Reflection-impulsivity appears to be related to the 
cognitive control principle of "focusing-scanning" described 
by Gardner and his associates in 1959. Impulsives do not 
visually scan all of the alternative stimuli in the MFFT 
before responding, whereas reflectives do (Drake, 1970).
The reflective-impulsive dimension of cognitive style 
has direct, proven relevance for educational settings (Kogan,
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1971) and has been most extensively studied in this context. 
The more recent adult form of the MFFT (purchaseable directly 
from Dr. Kagan) has yet to generate a research literature 
comparable to that extant for children.
In his review of the reflection-impulsivity literature, 
Messer (1976) emphasizes relatively recent criticisms of the 
usual double-median-split method of categorizing impulsives 
and reflectives. Traditionally, only those scoring below 
the median for latency and above the median in errors have 
been classified as impulsives; the converse group (high 
latency and low errors), reflectives. Fast-accurate and 
slow-inaccurate groups were ignored. This squandering of 
data results in loss of statistical power and results in 
analysis of variance designs whereas multiple regression 
techniques have been suggested as more appropriate.
Conceptual Differentiation and Category Width
In 1956, Jerome Bruner and his associates (Bruner, 
Goodnow, & Austin, 1956) demonstrated that individuals vary 
in a self-consistent manner in their estimation of extreme 
limits of a wide variety of categories. For example, in 
selecting the darkest and lightest brightness of an over­
cast sky, or the highest and lowest pitch of a female singing 
voice, subjects tended to be consistently broad, medium, or 
narrow in their limit-selection of categories, relative to
the total group.
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This interesting cognitive style dimension is defined 
by Messick (1976) as "consistent preferences for broad inclu­
siveness as opposed to narrow exclusiveness in establishing 
the acceptable range for specified categories" (p. 15). It 
has been variously called "category width," "breadth of cate­
gorization," "equivalence range," "(conceptual) band width" 
(Messick, 1976), and "coarseness-fineness" in categorizing 
(Fillenbaum, 1959).
Gardner and his associates (1959) used the term "equi­
valence range" to refer to a somewhat different type of task.
In a free-sorting situation, individuals had been found to 
vary in terms of the number of sub-categories they spontane­
ously created. A broad equivalence range was inferred from 
the creation of relatively few categories; a narrow equivalence 
range was inferred from creation of relatively many categories. 
Later, performance on the free-sort type of task in terms of 
number of different categories generated by the subject came 
to be called "conceptual differentiation" (Messick, 1976), 
which Messick defined as "individual differences in the ten­
dency to categorize perceived similarities and differences 
among stimuli in terms of many differentiated concepts or 
dimensions" (p. 15).
The similarity of the dimensions of category width and 
conceptual differentiation is apparent, and in fact these 
and the aforementioned terms are frequently confused or used 
interchangeably. However, Sloane, Gorlow, and Jackson (1963)
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found a variety of sorting tests to load on a single factor, 
whereas various other measures of conceptual band width and 
"associative ease" (or lack of criticalness) loaded on clearly 
different factors. Messick (1976) has made the careful dis­
tinction that conceptual differentiation "refers to the 
relative multiplicity of distinctions between or among con­
cepts, while category width or equivalence range refers to the 
extent of a single concept's range of reference" (pp. 15-16).
In the present study, this conceptual distinction has been 
maintained, with separate measures included to represent the 
two dimensions of conceptual differentiation and category width.
Bruner and Tajfel (1961) report a positive correlation 
between narrow category width and tests of intelligence.
However, Messick and Kogan (1965) found that when there is a 
large numerical spread in the response alternatives on quan­
titative multiple-choice tests, broad categorizers do better 
than narrow categorizers. This relationship disappears if 
actual computations are required, or if the response alter­
natives are narrowly spaced. In a rather complicated study 
of line-length judgments under Noise and No-Noise conditions, 
narrow categorizers were significantly less accurate in the 
discriminations under the noise-free condition. Under the 
noise condition, no main effect of category width was found, 
but its interaction with sex was significant: Narrow cate­
gory width males were more accurate, while broad category 
width females were more accurate. In an all-male sample,
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broad category width correlated significantly with the total 
number of adjectives checked as self-descriptive on the Adjec­
tive Check List, interpreted as "self-concept span" (r = .30, 
p < .01; Pettigrew, 1958). In an all-female sample (Petti­
grew, 1958), category width was unrelated to the F (authori­
tarianism) scale and to the Rokeach Dogmatism scale. Wallach 
and Kogan (1965) found significant positive correlations of 
category breadth and divergent-thinking tests of creativity, 
the broader categorizers demonstrating greater divergence, at 
least among children. Narrow categorizers do better than 
broad categorizers on a memory-for-faces task (Messick & 
Damarin, 1964). Most studies report females to be narrower 
categorizers than males (Pettigrew, 1958; Bieri, 1969).
While conceptual differentiation as measured by sorting 
tasks has been found to correlate positively with category 
width in a number of studies (cf. Ragan et al., 1979), others 
have shown a lack of consistency between the two dimensions 
of cognitive style. Conceptual differentiation (number of 
groups created in a sorting task) correlates positively with 
vocabulary level and verbal knowledge (Messick & Kogan, 1963). 
The tendency to "compartmentalize," or form "groups" con­
taining only single items, correlates negatively with 
measures of creativity (cf. Ragan et al., 1979). Lack of 
differentiation (creation of relatively few groups) is signi­
ficantly related to a stylistic preference for extremely- 
worded, sweeping generalizations (Clayton & Jackson, 1961);
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on the other hand, high differentiation (large number of 
groups) is significantly related with authoritarian item con­
tent when it is stated in probabilistic terms (Clayton & Jack- 
son, 1961). The correlations reported by Gardner et al. (1959)
of sorting task scores with EFT and Stroop performance of both 
males and females are nonsignificant, when their sample sizes 
are considered.
The most popular measure of category width appears to be 
the paper-and-pencil category width scale of Pettigrew (Petti­
grew, 1958; cf. Kogan, 1971, and Ragan et al., 1979). An 
abbreviated form of this test, consisting of only those items 
which discriminated between the broad and narrow thirds of the 
sample at the .10 level or better (Pettigrew, 1958) was utilized 
in the present study. In regard to the conceptual differentia­
tion dimension, no standard instrument of assessment has yet 
been developed (Ragan et al., 1979). Clayton and Jackson (1961) 
used lists of written objects for sorting, and scores on these 
sorting tasks loaded on the same factor as scores on sorting 
tasks using actual objects (Sloane et al., 1963). Unfortunate­
ly, Clayton and Jackson did not publish the lists of objects 
they used. Therefore, a written sorting task was created for 
the present study, which included the same number of items as 
previous sort tasks, based upon the same criteria for item 
inclusion (Clayton & Jackson, 1961; Gardner et al., 1959).
Cognitive Complexity
"Of the various cognitive styles and strategies . . .
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cognitive complexity-simplicity is most strongly beset by 
problems of adequacy of conceptualization and method" (Kogan, 
1971, p. 271). In most general terms, cognitive complexity is 
defined as "individual differences in the tendency to construe 
the world in a multidimensional and complex qay" (Ragan et al., 
1979). However, some researchers stress only the number of 
different dimensions used by individuals in analyzing their 
environment, and others take into account the "hierarchic- 
integration " structure of the dimensions employed.
The first approach, the "differentiation" view of cog­
nitive complexity, originated in the personal constructs 
theory of George Kelly (1955). Kelly devised a Role Con­
structs Repertory (REP) Test, to measure the complexity of 
an individual's personal construct repertoire utilized in 
judging similarities and differences in his or her social 
environment. The REP test was quite cumbersome in its 
original form, and a modified form of the REP (Tripodi &
Bieri, 1963) simplified administration and scoring and also 
correlated substantially with the original REP test (Jaspars, 
1964; Tripodi & Bieri, 1963).
Cognitive complexity in the sense proposed by Kelly is 
unrelated to vocabulary and verbal intelligence, at least 
among college students (Bieri, 1961; Bieri & Blacker, 1956 ).' 
However, "total complexity" (a composite of the REP and other 
measures of complexity including the Barron-Welsh Art Scale) 
correlates significantly with "reputational Social IQ," a
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measure based upon sociometric peer ratings (r = .54 p < .01; 
Sechrest & Jackson, 1961). Bieri (1955) found that high- 
complex subjects were more accurate than low-complex subjects 
in the accurate prediction of differences between the self 
and others, although they were not more accurate in the pre­
diction of similarities. Consistently, low-complex judges 
appear to be better attuned to discriminating regularities 
in the social environment in a sequential judgment task, 
but high-complex judges show superior processing of incon- 
gruent information (Tripodi & Bieri, 1964). Also, high- 
complex judges are more confident in their judgments of 
incongruency, while low-complex judges express more certainty 
about their judgments of congruent information (Tripodi & 
Bieri, 1964). In impression-formation tasks, low-complex 
individuals respond more to superficial qualities of behavior, 
in contrast to high-complex individuals, who pay greater 
attention to inner psychological states (Leventhal & Singer, 
1964). High-complex persons project more conflict into TAT 
stories (Tripodi & Bieri, 1966), and complexity correlates 
significantly with four different indices of determinant 
complexity as well as with two indices of content complexity 
on the Rorschach (Bieri & Blacker, 1956). A detailed review 
of this type of cognitive complexity, as well as an explicit 
description of the modified REP test (which was utilized in 
the present study), may be found in Bieri, Atkins, Briar, 
Leaman, Miller, & Tripodi (1966).
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A second and quite different view of cognitive complex­
ity is based upon the conceptual systems theory of Harvey, 
Hunt, and Schroder (1961). This is the "integrative com­
plexity" model which purports to be concerned with cognition 
in general, as opposed to just persons and social environ­
ments. It takes into account a dimension of concreteness- 
abstractness as well as criteria such as absolutism, the 
presence and nature of qualifications, and relationships to 
authority, and thus complexity is determined more by the 
quality of constructs than by their multiplicity. The measure 
of integrative complexity is the "This I Believe" Test (TIB), 
which is a sentence-completion task. With intensive training, 
judges are reportedly able to achieve high interscorer 
reliabilities with the TIB (Greaves, 1971). Also, it does 
not appear to make any difference whether the TIB is admin­
istered in its original timed form or under the condition of 
no time limit (Greaves, 1971).
Unlike the type of complexity measured by the REP, 
integrative complexity is quite strongly correlated with 
verbal IQ (r = .40; Schroder, Driver & Streufert, 1967). 
Integrative complexity is unrelated, however, to mere verbal 
fluency (length of sentence completions) and Edwards Social 
Desirability (Schroder et al., 1967).
Harvey (1966) reports that integrative complexity is 
related to the REP, although he does not report the magnitude 
or significance level of the correlation. In a factor
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analytic study of complexity, Vannoy (1965) found the two 
measures to load on different factors. Apparently, addi­
tional study is needed to clarify the relationship of com­
plexity as measured by the REP, and integrative complexity.
The dimensions of cognitive style of relevance to the 
present study have been reviewed. In the sections to follow, 
evidence of functional asymmetries in the human brain will 
be presented, followed by a review of studies which investi­
gate a possible relationship between differential brain 
hemispheric function and cognitive style.
Functional Brain Asyirmetries: Pathological Groups
For over a century, it has been known that the left 
cerebral hemisphere in most humans is the dominant hemisphere 
for speech as well as motor control of the usually preferred 
(right) hand. "By a curious extrapolation, the left hemis­
phere also came to be regarded as dominant for all complex 
cognitive processes, with the right of lesser importance, 
except for elementary sensory and motor functions" (Milner, 
1971, p. 272). Hence, the left hemisphere was called the 
"major" hemisphere, the right, "minor." This traditional 
view has now been largely rejected, with the breakthrough 
occurring on the basis of clinical studies of well-lateralized 
brain lesions in the 1940's, split-brain animal studies in 
the 1950's, and perhaps most dramatically, studies of human 
commissurotomy (split-brain) patients in the 1960's.
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The human cerebral commissurotomies were performed in 
cases of intractible convulsive disorders, in efforts to 
confine the seizures to one side of the brain. The surgery 
resulted in an apparent lack of change in personality and 
ordinary behavior. However, special testing under the direc­
tion of R. W. Sperry indicated "functional disengagement of 
the right and left hemispheres with respect to nearly all 
cognitive and other psychic activities. Learning and memory 
(were) found to proceed quite independently in each separated 
hemisphere" (Sperry, Gazzaniga & Bogen, 1969, p. 275).
Objects seen in one visual hemifield were not perceived or 
remembered in the other. Pictures or objects presented to 
the right hemisphere were reported by patients to be "nothing," 
or at most, a "flash of light;" yet these stimuli could be 
recognized and identified nonverbally, such as by pointing.
If a pair of different objects was presented simultaneously 
to the right and left hemifields, the left hand (right hemis­
phere) selected only the object pictured in the left hemi­
field (right hemisphere); but if asked to name the object, 
the patient responded only with the name of the other, right- 
hemifield (left hemisphere) object and verbally denied seeing 
anything but the latter. In this sense, only the hemisphere 
capable of naming objects was "conscious."
Each of the separated hemispheres has its own visual 
sensations, percepts, associated concepts and short- and long-term memories . . . (I)t is as if twoseparate brains were viewing the left and right 
halves of the visual field, only one of which is 
able to communicate what it sees through speech or
48
writing. (Sperry et al. , 1969, p. 278 )
Similarly, objects placed in the right hand were named, de­
scribed, and handled normally; patients were unable to name 
or describe objects held out of sight in the left hand. If 
different objects were placed in both hands at once, the 
patient denied even the presence of a stimulus in the left 
hand.
Sperry and his co-workers found not only a functional 
disengagement of the two hemispheres of the commissurotomized 
patients, but also functional asymmetries which went beyond 
verbal expression. While the left hemisphere appeared 
dominant for numerical calculations as well as for speech 
and writing, the right hemisphere was superior to the left 
in spatial constructions. Milner and Taylor (1972) subse­
quently submitted compelling evidence of the isolated right 
hemisphere's superiority in the perception of spatial 
patterns. The isolated right hemisphere is more adept at 
classifying pictures of objects according to shape, while 
the left hemisphere excels at classification based upon 
function (Levy & Trevarthem, 1976). Right-hemispheric 
lesions in the temporal-parietal area are associated with 
a variety of spatial deficits including visual closure tasks 
and the perception of faces in high-contrast drawings (Ben­
ton, 1979).
The right hemisphere is not entirely lacking in verbal
ability. When testing conditions were arranged to permit an 
appropriate (nonverbal) response, the right hemisphere of 
split-brain patients could read many words and understand 
spoken sentences (Bogen, 1969a, 1979). Additional studies 
of hemispherectomy and unilateral lesion patients demonstrated 
that the right hemisphere comprehends nouns better than verbs 
(Bogen, 1969a) and can direct the verbalization of descrip­
tive phrases, similes, and metaphorical expressions appro­
priately (Bogen, 1969b). Following complete left hemis­
pherectomy, an individual may retain the capacity to sing, 
pray, and utter oaths (Smith, 1966). Bogen (1969b) concluded 
that it is not the mere possession of words which differen­
tiates the hemispheres, but rather, the use of words in 
"propositional" vs. "appositional" thought. Propositional 
thinking, he suggested, is logical, convergent and analytic, 
whereas appositional thought is intuitive, divergent, and 
gestalt (cf. Corballis, 1980).
Certain aspects of musical ability, such as melody and 
rhythm perception, also appear to be represented in the right 
hemisphere (Bogen, 1969b). Alajouanine (1948) observed 
characteristics of creative artists who acquired aphasia 
(left hemisphere damage). The musician (Ravel) lost his 
ability to read musical notation, but he was unimpaired in 
melodic, rhythmic and stylistic sense and in playing or 
singing from memory. Conversely, right temporal lobectomy has 
been associated with impaired discrimination of tonal patterns.
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tone quality and timbre (Milner, 1967). Motor amusia 
(avocalia), or inability to reproduce tones, has been related 
to unilateral right (or bilateral) lesions, while musical 
comprehension deficits have been clinically observed more 
frequently with left-sided lesions (Hecaen, 1969).
Lateral asymmetries have also been observed in clinical 
populations in the area of emotional expression. Flor-Henry 
(1969a, 1969b, 1972) reported a preponderance of left-sided 
and bilateral temporal lobe epilepsies among schizophrenic 
and schizo-affective psychotics, while right-sided epileptics 
were most frequently diagnosed manic-depressive. Lishman 
(1968) found more "intellectual" impairments among left­
sided brain-injured individuals, and more affective disorders 
among the right. Comparing self-ratings with ratings by 
others of the interictal (between-seizure) behavior of 
temporal lobe epileptics, Bear and Fedio (1977) found the 
right-lesion group to unde'rate their own sadness and 
aggression and overrate their own conscientious behavior 
("image-polishing"). Conversely, the left-lesion group 
described themselves as angry, paranoid, and dependent and 
underrated their own conscientiousness ("image-tarnishing"). 
In response to intracarotid sodium amobarbital injection, 
which briefly anesthetizes one hemisphere of the brain, a 
"catastrophic" reaction more frequently follows anesthesia 
of the left hemisphere, while a "euphoric-maniacal" reaction 
more frequently follows right-hemisphere inactivation
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(Gainotti, 1972; Rossi & Rosadini, 1967). Milner (1967) was 
unable to replicate these findings, however, with 104 Cana­
dian patients undergoing the amobarbital test.
Flor-Henry (1976) studied groups of schizophrenics and 
affective psychotics without epilepsy, and reported both 
neuropsychological and EEG test data implicating left temporal 
lobe dysfunction in the former and bilateral (but predomin­
antly right temporal) abnormality in the latter. Yozawitz 
and his co-workers (Yozawitz, Bruder, Sutton, Sharpe, Gurland, 
Fleiss, & Costa, 1979) found left-right ear preferences of 
affective psychotics on a dichotic listening task to resemble 
those found among patients with known right-hemispheric 
lesions. Bipolar illness followed right hemispherectomy in 
a recent case report (Forrest, 1982), which highlights the 
issue of whether differential emotional reactions may be 
associated with hemisphere-specific dysfunction or failure 
to inhibit processes of the other hemisphere (cf. D. Tucker, 
1981).
Stern (1977) and Galin, Diamond, and Braff (1977) re­
ported greater incidence of left-sided than right-sided 
dysfunction in cases of hysterical conversion reactions.
They suggested that the right hemisphere may play a central 
role in the mediation of affectively or motivationally 
determined somatic symptoms. Bishop, Mobley, and Farr (1978), 
however, failed to confirm a predominance of left-sided 
occurrence of conversion symptoms. They noted that the left­
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sided predominance was observed only among female subjects 
and thus the effect may be related to sex.
The foregoing review is more accurately an overview of 
the extensive clinical literature regarding functional brain 
asymmetries. More detailed reviews are available in the areas 
of commissurotomy (Bogen, 1979; Gazzaniga, 1970), unilateral 
lesion syndromes (Heilman & Valenstein, 1979), and psycho­
pathology and hemispheric dysfunction (Marin & G. Tucker,
1981; D. Tucker, 1981). The purposes of the present overview 
are only to illustrate the range of functional brain asymme­
tries found among clinical populations, and to emphasize 
that in the surgically separated state, the two hemispheres 
are capable of functioning quite independently, although in 
qualitatively different modes.
Functional Brain Asymmetries: Nonpathological Groups
Surgical disconnection may provide an unusual and drama­
tic opportunity to directly investigate the differential 
capacities and functions of the brain hemispheres , but the 
question naturally arises as to generality of the findings 
to normal, intact human brains. Prior to disconnection of 
the hemispheres, commissurotomy patients manifested extremely 
abnormal brain function which, after all, necessitated the 
operation. Similarly, we cannot assume that the left and 
right hemispheres of the normally integrated brain are 
functionally lateralized in the same manner as those of 
unilateral lesion or psychiatric populations.
53
Investigation of functional brain asymmetries in non- 
pathological populations is hampered by the methodological 
problem of how to assess differential hemispheric involve­
ment in the characteristic or performance under study. 
Basically, this assessment takes one of three forms: (1) EEG
analysis, which is a direct measure of surface activity of 
the brain, (2) unilateral stimulus presentation, such as in 
tachistoscopic or dichotic listening studies, or (3) obser­
vational or other indirect methods, which are theoretically 
assumed to reflect differential hemispheric involvement.
Electroencephalographic (EEG) studies of differential 
hemispheric function among nonpatients have taken one of two 
forms: measurement of alpha-wave suppression (an indication
of corticol arousal) in different areas of the brain, or 
asymmetries in evoked potentials from the right and left 
hemispheres. By such methods, the left cerebral hemisphere 
of normal subjects appears to be more active than the right 
hemisphere during arithmetic and verbal or linguistic task 
performance, while the right hemisphere appears to be more 
involved than the left during performance of visuospatial 
and musical tasks (Buchsbaum & Fedio, 1970; Galin & Ornstein, 
1972; McAdam & Whitaker, 1971; McKee, Humphrey & McAdam,
1973; Morgan, McDonald & MacDonald, 1971; Morrell & Salamy, 
1971; Wood, Goff & Day, 1971). In addition, differential 
hemispheric arousal has been associated with varying affec­
tive states (Harman & Ray, 1977; Tucker, Stenslie, Roth &
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Shearer, 1981), although the findings in this area are more 
inconsistent, possibly due to ambiguities in definitions of 
"positive" and "negative" affect (cf. Tucker et al., 1981).
Tachistoscopic (T-scope) presentation allows investiga­
tion of differential reaction times to visual stimuli in the 
right hemifield (left hemisphere) vs. left hemifield (right 
hemisphere). This method also reveals left-hemispheric 
superiority in normals for verbal material (and easily 
verbally-labelled objects), and right-hemispheric superiority 
in face recognition, perception of the location and quantity 
of dots, line slope discrimination and depth perception 
(Arndt & Berger, 1978; Kimura, 1966; Kinsbourne, 1970;
McKeever & Huling, 1970; Milner, 1971; Rizzolatti, Umilta 
& Berlucchi, 1971). Similarly, dichotic listening studies 
indicate greater left-hemispheric (right-ear) proficiency in 
the discrimination of digits, consonants, words, and semantic 
content, and greater right-hemispheric (left-ear) proficiency 
in recognition of simple pitch patterns, melodies, environ­
mental sounds, nonverbal human sounds such as crying, shrieking 
and laughing, and emotional tone of voice (Carmon & Nachshon, 
1973; Haggard & Parkinson, 1971; Kimura, 1963, 1964, 1967;
Knox & Kimura, 1970; Mazzucchi & Parma, 1978; Milner, 1971; 
Safer & Leventhal, 1977). Right-ear (left-hemispheric) 
attentional bias has also been associated with decrements in 
visual imagery, trait anxiety, and an induced depressive mood 
(Tucker et al., 1981).
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Interestingly, lateralization of some musical functions 
may depend in part upon the degree of musical training.
Bever and Chiarello (1974) found a left-hemispheric super­
iority among trained musicians in melody recognition, while 
nonmusicians demonstrated the more typical right-hemispheric 
advantage on this task. Similarly, an EEG study showed 
greater left-hemispheric activity in musicians when whistling 
a song, but greater right-hemispheric activation in non­
musicians performing the same task (Davidson & Schwartz, 1977).
A variant of the unilateral stimulus presentation 
methodology is the "chimeric face paradigm," in which the 
subject is presented with one-half of a photographed face 
combined with its mirror-image. Studies utilizing this 
paradigm suggest that the left side of a viewed face (which 
is the right side of the face being viewed) is considered 
most similar to the original photographed face (Gilbert and 
Bakan, 1973), and that it is judged more emotionally expres­
sive than the right side of the viewed face (Campbell,
1978), even though actual left-face composites are rated 
as expressing emotion more intensely than right-face com­
posites (Sackeim, Gur & Saucy, 1978). Campbell (1978) has 
noted the "intriguing possibility . . . that the side of the 
face which dominates a viewer's impression when he is looking 
at another person is not the side which the expressor is 
using most strongly" (p. 338). In any case, these studies 
suggest greater right- than left-hemispheric involvement in
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both the perception and expression of affect (cf. Hayne,
Note 3).
The third general type of investigation of laterality 
effects in nonpathological groups includes those studies 
utilizing observational or inferential measures of hemis­
pheric involvement. By far, the most common measure of this 
type is the observation and quantification of lateral eye 
movements (LEMs) in response to questions requiring some 
degree of reflective thought. Merle Day (1964) originally 
described the LEM phenomenon, which is a tendency for 
individuals to look briefly to the right or left after pre­
sentation of an oral question and prior to oral response. 
However, Bakan (1969) was the first to propose that LEMs may 
be an index of hemispheric asymmetry, a position elaborated 
in more explicit neuropsychological terms by Kinsbourne (1972, 
1974). Theoretically, a lateral eye movement under the im­
posed reflective condition is indicative of activation of 
the contralateral hemisphere. While some investigators 
utilizing the LEM method focus upon contrasting characteris­
tics of "right-lookers" (or right-movers) and "left-lookers" 
(left-movers)— i.e., groups of subjects displaying a dispro­
portionate number of LEMs to the right or left--others focus 
on the situational factors which may affect direction of 
initial gaze shifts.
In support of his proposal of LEMs as an index of 
hemispheric asymmetry, Bakan (1969) provided evidence that
left-lookers (right-hemispheric "types") possessed clearer 
visual imagery, were more susceptible to hypnosis, and more 
frequently chose "soft majors" as opposed to "hard" scientific 
majors than right-lookers. Morgan, McDonald and MacDonald 
(1971) also reported an association between left lateral eye 
movements and hypnotizability. Harnad (1972) found left- 
lookers to score higher than right-lookers on the Remote 
Associates Test, a presumed measure of creativity. Left- 
lookers are more "inner attentive" than right-lookers, as 
determined by a combined score on the Repression-Sensitiza­
tion scale and an imagery test (Meskin & Singer, 1974). Gur 
and Gur (1975) found a positive association between left­
looking and incidence of psychosomatic symptoms as well as 
greater utilization of the defense mechanisms of repression 
and denial. More left lateral eye movemenets were observed 
among college students classified as "hysteric" in style on 
the basis of a modified Rorschach procedure, as opposed to 
those classified as "obsessive-compulsive" (Smokier &
Shevrin, 1979).
While the earliest LEM research focused upon personality 
differences of left and right hemispheric "types" of indivi­
duals, a somewhat later development was an emphasis upon the 
effect of task and situation variables upon lateral eye move­
ments. This direction of LEM research, based upon the 
Kinsbourne (1972, 1974) theoretical model, is exemplified 
by studies showing relationships between right LEMs and
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verbal, numerical, and nonemotional item content, and between 
left LEMs and musical, spatial, and emotional item content 
(Gur, Gur & Harris, 1975; Schwartz, Davidson & Maer, 1975; 
Weitan & Etaugh, 1976). Situational variables which have 
been related to LEM behavior include experimenter location 
(Gur, Gur & Harris, 1975) and experimentally-induced stress, 
or performance anxiety (D. Tucker, Roth, Arneson & Buckingham,
1977) , the latter being associated with increased frequency 
of left lateral eye movements.
The early LEM studies generated considerable excitement, 
not only because of positive and theoretically meaningful 
findings, but also because of the relative ease of LEM 
assessments. However, the LEM-hemispheric asymmetry model 
has been criticized due to mixed experimental outcomes, 
methodological inconsistencies, and theoretical ambiguities.
Of 19 experiments comparing LEM response to "left-hemispheric" 
vs. "right-hemispheric" questions, for example, only nine 
yielded results in the expected direction (Ehrlichman & 
Weinberger, 1978).
In addition to the LEM observational procedure, later­
ality among nonpathological groups has been assessed indirectly 
by means of self-report questionnaires. Questionnaires of 
this type include the Zenhausern Preference Test (Zenhausern,
1978) and the Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (Richardson, 
1977). Both of these questionnaires purport to assess visual
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vs. nonvisual thinking style. Theoretically, the two styles 
are a direct consequence of cerebral dominance, the visual 
mode being associated with right hemispheric dominance, the 
nonvisual or verbal, with left hemispheric dominance.
Using an early form of the Zenhausern test (ZEN) in 
conjunction with a similar questionnaire, Zenhausern and 
Gebhardt (1979) investigated the relationship of hemispheric 
dominance to the recall of words both high and low in imagery 
value, with auditory and visual presentation. Their findings 
included significant three- and four-way interactions which 
nearly defy comprehension, and even the authors dismiss these 
in their discussion except to remark that "their mere exis­
tence . . . supports the use of hemispheric dominance as a
meaningful classifying variable" (p. 73). However, their 
main finding was of a consistent relationship between audi­
tory input and a left-hemispheric style on the one hand, and 
between visual input and a right-hemispheric style on the 
other. This pattern of relationships was interpreted as con­
sistent with the theory of left-hemispheric specialization 
for sequential auditory input, and right-hemispheric special­
ization for visual-spatial information processing.
In a similarly complex research design, Coleman and 
Zenhausern (1979) compared male and female left- and right- 
dominant groups, on a discriminative reaction-time task in 
which both target and probe stimuli were varied (words or 
pictures). Somewhat confusingly, "right dominants," as
60
identified by agreement between the ZEN and a similar ques­
tionnaire, were faster in reaction time on the discrimination 
task than "left dominants," but at the same time, reaction 
time was significantly faster for probes presented to the 
left-hemisphere than for probes presented to the right- 
hemisphere. The faster left-hemisphere processing was ob­
served for both words and pictures, and the effect was four 
times stronger in "left dominants" than "right dominants." 
Again, the reader will not be subjected to the interpre­
tive throes of a significant three-way interaction of target 
type, probe type, and hemispheric dominance. Generally, the 
authors interpreted the findings as indicative of "two 
distinct groups: one which is more efficient in tasks that 
demand a parallel processing mode, and another which is more 
efficient at tasks that demand a sequential processing mode" 
(p. 360).
Zenhausern and Gebhardt (1979) report a 70% agreement 
between the early ZEN questionnaire and the "Your Style of 
Learning and Thinking" questionnaire (Torrance, Reynolds, 
Riegel & Ball, 1971), another purported measure of subjective 
p.eference for right-hemispheric vs. left-hemispheric func­
tions. Reliability of the ZEN measure is unknown.
The Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ) of Rich- - 
ardson (1977) is similar in item content to the ZEN. The 
VVQ was empirically derived from Paivio's (1971) 86-item 
Ways of Thinking questionnaire on the basis of item corre­
lation with left lateral eye movements. Richardson reports
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a seven-day test-retest reliability of .91 and freedom from 
social desirability response bias (correlations with the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale ranged from .00 to 
-.07 in the original series of studies). Reliability was 
substantially lower with a different, younger sample and 
longer (three week) test-retest interval (Warren & Good, 1979). 
However, the validity of the W Q  was supported in the Warren 
and Good study by discriminating subjects who responded 
favorably and those who responded less favorably to a parti­
cular (verbal) therapy mode. Additional data summaries pro­
vided by the author with a copy of his test (Richardson, Note 
4) revealed that, while a 1979 sample of females continued 
to demonstrate nonsignificant correlations of W Q  and social 
desirability, W Q  scores of a 1979 male sample were signifi­
cantly correlated with social desirability (r = -.38, p < .01, 
n = 49). Since the W Q  is scored in the direction of visual­
izing tendency, results indicated that the higher the visual­
izing tendency of these male subjects, the lower the social 
desirability scores. Richardson (1977) relies primarily upon 
the studies of Kinsbourne (1972) and Kocel, Galin, Ornstein 
& Merrin (1972) as theoretical bases for the presumed rela­
tionship between self-reported visualizing tendency and 
hemispheric specialization.
In summary, an impressive number of EEG and bilateral 
stimulus presentation studies, as well as a substantial pro­
portion of the LEM studies, point to hemispheric specialization
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in nonpathological groups that is similar to that demonstrated 
with clinical populations. Specifically, the left hemisphere 
appears to be specialized for the processing of verbal and 
linguistic information, while the right hemisphere appears to 
be more involved in visuospatial and some musical functions 
(at least among nonmusicians). Also, studies have been re­
viewed which suggest a special but not yet well-defined role 
in the processing of emotional stimuli, and possibly in per­
sonality characteristics such as suggestibility and features 
consistent with an hysteric personality style.
Based upon the evidence of functional brain asymmetries 
in both clinical and nonpathological groups, several leading 
investigators (e.g., Bogen, 1969a; Levy, 1969; Nebes, 1974) 
have suggested a neuropsychological model of cognitive style. 
According to this model, the two hemispheres of the brain are 
not merely specialized to deal with differing task content 
(i.e., verbal vs. nonverbal). Rather, they are specialized 
for different processing modes. The mode of the left hemis­
phere is analytic, sequential, and logical. Its facility 
with linguistic material and propositional speech is com­
patible with this mode, although the cause-effect relation­
ship between language development and left-hemispheric cog­
nitive style is the subject of current speculation (cf.
Joseph, 1982). The mode of the right hemisphere is global 
or holistic, nonsequential, and intuitive in nature— hence 
its demonstrated superiority in a variety of tasks requiring
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pattern perception and construction, its facility for simile 
and metaphor even when propositional speech is absent, and 
its sensitivity to emotional and other nonverbal environmental 
cues. Galin (1974) eloquently compared current notions of 
left-right hemispheric style with Freud's early structural 
theory, noting the irony that perhaps the neuropsychological 
view will eventually reaffirm a structural basis for uncon­
scious process. He noted several congruencies of right-hemis­
pheric functioning with the primary process, a form of thought 
originally assigned to the Unconscious: nonverbal mode of 
representation, nonlinear mode of association, less involve­
ment with perception of time and sequence, and nonproposi- 
tional speech (e.g., metaphors, puns, double-entendre— "word 
pictures"). Conversely, left-hemispheric style is congruent 
with conscious, goal-directed, sequential, verbal, logical 
secondary-process thinking.
However, our goal is not to simply translate the terms 
of one theoretical model into those of another. Rather, we 
shall first review those studies directly involved in deter­
mining relationships between laterality measures and tradi­
tional tests of cognitive style, followed by delineation of 
objectives of the present study.
Laterality and Cognitive Style
Studies designed to specifically investigate relation­
ships between differential hemispheric function and traditional
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measures of cognitive style are relatively few in number.
Of 644 bibliographic citations in a quite recent review of 
the cognitive style literature (Back et al., 1979), only 14 
involved the concept of lateralized brain function in any 
way (if we include, for example, studies of hand, ear or eye 
dominance in relation to cognitive style). Of the traditional 
cognitive style dimensions, these studies were nearly exclu­
sively concerned with field dependence-independence.
A study of unilateral lesion patients (Russo & Vignolo, 
1967) led to tentative conceptualization of field independence 
as a manifestation of analytic, left-hemispheric capacity. 
However, the relationship of laterality and field indepen­
dence appears to be more complex. Several studies have shown 
more field independent subjects to evidence greater left- 
hemispheric lateralization for verbal functions (Pizzamiglio, 
1974; Pizzamiglio & Carli, 1974; Pizzamiglio & Cecchini,
1971; Waber, 1976), but Oltman, Ehrlichman & Cox (1976) found 
that more field independent subjects also demonstrated greater 
right-hemispheric specialization in a face perception task. 
Oltman et al. suggest that field independence tasks may re­
quire both perceptual analysis and synthesis, and thus field 
independence may be a function of greater lateralization of 
both left- and right-hemispheric functions. Zoccolotti & 
Oltman (1978) compared field independent and dependent sub­
jects on both left- and right-hemispheric tasks. They found, 
as expected, that the field independent group not only showed
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a greater right-hemifield (left-hemispheric) superiority in 
letter recognition but also a greater left-hemifield (right- 
hemispheric) superiority in face discrimination. They reported 
an overall correlation of .35 (£ < .10) between extent of 
right-hemifield superiority for letter discrimination and 
left-hemifield superiority for face discrimination. Field 
dependent subjects did not demonstrate significant hemifield 
differences on either type of task. "Apparently, the field- 
dependent-independent dimension is related to the degree of 
segregation of functioning between the two hemispheres, 
rather than to some generalized tendency to use one or the 
other" (Zoccolotti & Oltman, 1978, p. 161). In support of 
this view, Silverman, Adevai and McGough (1966) had found non- 
right-handed individuals to be more field dependent than 
clearly right-handed individuals, suggesting that greater 
specialization of lateral function may be associated with 
field independence. D. Tucker (1976), utilizing a more 
sophisticated measure of lateral brain involvement than 
handedness, found both hemispheres to show EEG desynchroni­
zation during EFT performance.
If field independence is a function of greater bilateral 
specialization of function, one would expect a stronger asso­
ciation between right LEMs and verbal questions, and between 
left Lems and spatial questions, in more field independent 
individuals. However, Ehrlichman, Weiner and Baker (1974) 
found the opposite. Content-specific LEMs were less evident
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among field independent subjects than among their field 
dependent counterparts. Tucker (Note 5) found no association 
between right and left LEMs and field independence among either 
college students or young children, but in both groups, he 
found a positive relationship between field independence and 
frequency of nonlateral eye movements. In his discussion of 
these apparently inconsistent findings, Tucker noted that the 
unilateral stimulus presentation methods of Zoccolotti and 
Oltman and others tend to maximize lateralized processing, 
whereas the LEM procedure constitutes a free-choice situation 
in terms of task approach. Thus more field independent indi­
viduals may manifest greater functional differentiation of 
the hemispheres upon "demand," but on the LEM, their per­
formance may reflect relatively bilateral usage associated 
with greater integration. We are reminded of the distinc­
tion of Wachtel (1968) between capacity and style in analytic 
functioning, and of the fixity-mobility factor in field inde­
pendence (Witkin et al., 1971). Possibly, field independent 
functioning requires a capacity for specialized hemispheric 
task performance, but not an exclusively or even predominant 
reliance upon this mode in a naturalistic setting. On the 
contrary, field independent subjects may manifest greater 
bilateral, "integrated," or "mobile" usage in such a situation.
Integration of specialized hemispheric functions was 
viewed by Bogen and Bogen (1969) as the basis of creativity.
The hemispheres are not as much "major" and "minor"as . . . they are complementary, and each hemisphere
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is capable of thinking on its own, in its own way 
. . . Specialization of the hemispheres for different 
modes of thought greatly increases the flexibility and creativity of the ensemble. (p. 194)
While creativity is a general term which has been variously 
defined in terms of product, person, context and process 
variables (cf. Taylor, 1975), it is of relevance to the field 
of cognitive style because of the previously discussed 
associations between creative personality and cognitive 
style dimensions including reflection-impulsivity, rigidity, 
and figural complexity preference. A neuropsychological 
model of cognitive processes may generate additional hypo­
theses regarding the relationship between differential 
hemispheric function and cognitive style dimensions relevant 
to some aspects of the creative process. The Bogen and 
Bogen (1 969) model of creativity recognizes both left- 
hemispheric and right-hemispheric contributions, i.e., a 
differentiated and integrated state. Regarding the role 
of the right hemisphere in the creative process, they ob­
serve that "there are many persons possessing technical 
proficiency in music, drawing, or writing whose production 
is devoid of those innovative and informative values which 
distinguish an artist from a performer" (pp. 200-201). On 
the other hand, they quote Bruner to emphasize the role of 
the left hemisphere:
As surely as the recital of a daydream differs from 
the well-wrought tale, there is a barrier between 
undisciplined fantasy and Art. To climb the barrier
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requires a right hand [left hemisphere] adept at 
technique and artifice. (Bogen & Bogen, 1969, p. 200 ).
Ornstein and Galin (1976) and Dumas and Morgan (1975) 
found no overall EEG differences between lawyers and engineers 
on the one hand and artists, sculptors and ceramicists on the 
other during performance of left and right hemispheric tasks. 
Arndt and Berger (1978) found no differences in lateraliza­
tion (as measured by discriminative reaction time to left- 
right hemisphere stimuli presentation) among graduate students 
in sculpture, law, or psychology. These negative findings 
have been interpreted to contraindicate a relationship between 
hemispheric specialization and creativity (e.g., Corballis, 
1980), while in fact they merely confirm that creativity 
cannot be explained in terms of simple hemispheric dominance.
Some evidence suggests that, even presuming a bilateral 
contribution to the creative process, the pattern of hemis­
pheric contributions may differ among artists and nonartists 
in relevant task variables. Recall the studies of Bever and 
Chiarello (1974) and Davidson and Schwartz (1977), which 
indicated greater left-hemispheric involvement in musical 
tasks among musicians but greater right-hemispheric involve­
ment in the same tasks among nonmusicians.
Figural complexity preference was associated with verbal 
fluency in the studies of Barron (1953a). A number of neuro­
psychological studies of unilateral lesion patients have 
established an association between left but not right frontal
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lobe damage and defects in verbal fluency. " 'Dominant' 
frontal lesions but not 'minor' frontal ones, interfere with 
verbal processes, particularly in respect to spontaneity and 
the ability to maintain a flow of verbal evocation, without 
actually producing one of the typical aphasias" (Damasio, 
1979, p. 383). Zangwill (1976) found left frontal lesion 
patients to perform particularly poorly on tests of divergent 
thinking, a presumed measure of creativity which heavily 
relies upon verbal fluency. Possibly, the same neuropsycho­
logical basis of the verbal fluency aspect of creativity 
underlies figural complexity preference.
Martindale (1975) has proposed a cortical arousal model 
of creativity. He compared groups of "high- vs. low- 
creatives" (based upon performance on the Remote Associates 
and Alternate Uses Tests, two heavily verbal measures of 
creativity) in terms of EEG alpha activity while resting 
and while working on an "imaginative problem." He found 
that in the resting state, high creatives were more aroused 
in both hemispheres; this generally aroused state (in com­
parison to medium- and low-creative subject) was also 
suggested by higher levels of skin conductance.
Highly creative people amplify sights, sounds, and textures, the stimuli around them. They feel shock 
and noise more intensely; they exaggerate sizes and 
sensations. This over sensitivity is the subjective counterpart of the physiological overactivity that 
shows up in greater [bilateral] blocking on EEG 
records. (p. 48)
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Curiously, when engaged in imaginative task performance, 
the opposite results were obtained. High creatives then 
operated at the lowest level of arousal (most alpha), al­
though Martindale did not specify whether this effect was 
unilateral or bilateral. Martindale concludes from his 
series of studies that "creative people view the world and 
react to it unlike most of their peers do, not because they 
are eccentric and strange, but because they process informa­
tion differently" (p. 50).
The preceding sections have provided an overview of the 
cognitive style, functional brain asymmetry and laterality- 
cognitive style literatures. The following and concluding 
section of this chapter will present the purposes and ob­
jectives of the present study.
Purposes of the Present Study
Goldstein and Blackman (1978 ) concluded from their 
extensive review of the cognitive style literature that 
"studies designed to relate the variables used by one inves­
tigator to those used by other investigators are needed"
(p. 4). This constitutes one major purpose of the present 
study: to investigate the nature and degree of intercorre­
lation of various dimensions of cognitive style. Prior re­
search establishes expectancy of certain relationships among 
some subsets of cognitive style dimensions, as reviewed above. 
For example, it is expected that the theoretically and
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methodologically similar dimensions of dogmatism, rigidity 
and ambiguity intolerance will be significantly intercorre- 
lated. It is also expected that field indepencence will be 
negatively correlated with impulsivity, but independent of 
distractibility measures. For many other combinations of 
cognitive style dimensions, however, the lack of prior studies 
does not permit empirically-based expected relationships.
Simple intercorrelation of the cognitive style variables, 
as indicated by Goldstein and Blackman, is of interest in its 
own right. However, the second and larger purpose of the 
present study is to explore the relationship between cogni­
tive style and hemispheric function. Since none of the 
cognitive style tests utilized in the present study were 
developed within a neuropsychological theoretical context, 
there is little reason to predict an association between an 
index of laterality and any particular, individual cognitive 
style test, with the possible exception of field independence. 
However, it is proposed that the assorted cognitive style 
tests, when factor analyzed, will yield a fewer number of 
broad cognitive style factors, which in turn may relate 
meaningfully to a laterality index. The notion of reducing 
larger numbers of cognitive style test scores to a fewer 
number of factor scores for purposes of theoretical clarifi­
cation has precedent in the study of Mos, Wardell and Royce 
(1974). In this study, 26 variables for psychological differ­
entiation and cognitive abilities yielded eight factors. While
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the design of the Mos et al. study is similar in part to that 
of the present study, its scope was restricted primarily to 
investigation of relationships between perceptual differen­
tiation a la Witkin and conceptual differentiation as defined 
by Kagan. The present study applies to a larger variety of 
cognitive style test dimensions, and is an attempt to theore­
tically relate hemispheric mode to some basic and general 
cognitive style factors. Since the study is exploratory in 
nature, the precise nature of the cognitive style factors 
cannot be anticipated. Speculatively, however, such factors 
may include general dimensions including complexity/differen- 
tiation, verbal distractibility, and flexibility. Theoreti­
cally, since the laterality index is scored in the direction 
of right hemispheric preference, the first factor would be 
expected to relate negatively, the second positively, and 
the third either positively or negatively with extreme scores 
on the laterality index.
The laterality index used in the present study is a 
composite score, based upon three different measures of 
laterality (LEM, ZEN, and WQ). While each of these measures 
has its shortcomings, as described previously, it is proposed 
that the composite index may be a more reliable measure than 
any of its individual components.
In addition to the cognitive style and laterality tests, 
the present study also involves measures of left- and right- 
hemispheric ability. These are included in order to evaluate
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the cognitive dimensions in terms of the "ability vs. style" 
distinction of Kogan (1976). Additional measures of trait 
anxiety, repression-sensitization, and social desirability 
response bias are included in view of their potential rele­
vance to interpretation of cognitive style factors and/or 
the laterality index.
A description of the various tests used, the procedure 
and the statistical analyses performed will be presented in 
the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY
Subjects
The subjects were 52 female and 45 male right-handed 
undergraduate volunteers who received partial course credit 
for their participation in the study. Mean age of female 
and male subjects was 20.25 (S.D. = 3.45) and 21.42 (S.D. =
3.0), respectively. The predominantly white subject group 
included one Native American female, one Native American 
male, one black female and one black male. While equal num­
bers of males and females (n = 50) were sought according to 
the original design of the study, an insufficient number of 
male subjects was acquired despite vigorous recruitment 
efforts. Further contributing to the subsample size differ­
ential was the fact that two additional male subjects only 
partially completed the study and thus all of their data 
were omitted from subsequent analyses. All female subjects 
provided complete and usable data.
Tests Administered
Subjects were administered a variety of laterality, 
cognitive style and selected other tests. The laterality 
measures included the following:
Zenhausern Preference Test (ZEN). The revised ZEN con­
sists of 26 items which purport to assess visual vs. nonvisual 
thinking style. The forthright items require self-ratings by
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subjects on ten-point scales, with the rating poles varying 
according to item content. E.g., the poles associated with 
the item, "How vivid are your daydreams," are "Not at all," 
and "Extremely," whereas self-rating for the item "Are you 
fluent in using words," may vary from "Never" to "Always."
The raw ZEN score consists of the sum of right hemispheric 
item ratings (15 items) less the sum of left hemispheric item 
ratings (11 items).
Verbalizer-Visualizer Questionnaire (WQ ) . The W Q  
(Richardson, 1977) consists of 15 True-False items distributed 
among 15 "buffer" items. Designed to identify habitual ver- 
balizers and visualizers, it is scored in the direction of 
visualizing tendency. The critical items are highly similar 
in content to ZEN items (e.g., "My dreams are extremely vivid"). 
Six of the keyed items are scored if marked "True," nine are 
scored if marked "False." Scores may range from 0 (extreme 
verbalizer) to 15 (extreme visualizer).
Lateral Eye Movements (LEM). Four research assistants 
were trained in the administration of the LEM questionnaire 
and in the observation and recording of responses. The ques­
tionnaire (see Appendix A) consisted of a balanced subset 
of 20 items from those items originally used by Schwartz, 
Davidson and Maer (1975). Subjects were tested individually, 
seated across a table (approximately 2 h feet) from one of the 
four examiners. Experimental rooms were devoid of visual 
distractions. After presentation of each item, examiners 
covertly recorded direction of subject eye movements on a
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form resembling the face of a clock. Summary statistics were 
computed by examiners and rechecked by the investigator after 
the session. Interscorer reliability of the assistants in 
the scoring of nonlateral, right lateral and left lateral eye 
movements of a sample subject in videotaped interview was 
determined to be .96.
Assistants recorded the total number of nonlateral, right 
and left LEMs for each subject. The subsequent raw score 
computed for the LEM measure consisted of the proportion of 
left minus right lateral eye movements of all initial lateral 
eye movements, in order to be consistent in interpretation 
with the other laterality test scores. That is, a higher 
LEM score thus reflected more left-looking (presumably 
greater right hemispheric activation); the ZEN and VVQ are 
similarly scored in the direction of right hemispheric pre­
ference.
To obtain a combined laterality score (LAT) for each 
subject, scores on the component tests— ZEN, W Q , and LEM-- 
were standardized by sex and then averaged.
Cognitive style tests utilized in the final data analysis 
included eight group-administered and three individually 
administered tests. The group cognitive style tests in­
cluded the following:
Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT). The GEFT (Witkin 
et al., 1971) is a measure of field independence, or the 
ability to perceive simple geometric figures set within an
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embedding context. The examinee must retain the specified 
one of eight simple figures (printed on the back of the test 
booklet) in memory while examining the figure in which it is 
embedded, although no constraints are imposed regarding the 
number of times the simple figure may be re-examined. The 
examinee traces the outline of the specified simple figure 
in its embedded context. Two minutes are allowed for a prac­
tice series of seven items. Five minutes are allowed for each 
of two subsequent nine-item test series. The GEFT raw score 
consists of the total number of 18 test items solved correctly 
within the allotted time limit. Thus a high score reflects 
greater field independence or analytic ability.
Modified Role Construct Repertory Test (REP). Bieri et 
al. (1966) developed this modification of the Kelly REP test 
(Kelly, 1955) to measure cognitive complexity. The subject 
rates each of 10 personally familiar people on 10 personality 
dimensions, resulting in a grid of 100 numerical judgments 
ranging from +3 to -3. The rather complicated scoring pro­
cedure, described in detail by Bieri et al. (1966), considers
the degree of redundancy of ratings within individuals rated 
by the subject. Higher scores indicate relatively differen­
tiated intra-individual ratings (complexity), lower scores, 
relatively undifferentiated ratings (simplicity).
Category Width Scale (CWS). Developed by Pettigrew 
(1958), the breadth of categorization test measures consis­
tent individual preferences for broad inclusiveness vs.
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narrow exclusiveness in establishing an acceptable range for 
specified categories. On the CWS, the subject is given a 
fictitious series of "average" values of various stimuli 
and must select from multiple choices the presumed upper and 
lower limits of the category. For example, the examinee may 
be given "the average width of windows" and be asked to esti­
mate the width of "the widest window" and "the narrowest 
window." The multiple choices are keyed so that the broadest 
limits (numerically farthest from the fictitious mean) re­
ceive highest scores, the narrowest limits (closest to the 
given mean), the lowest. The keyed sum of all estimates is 
total CWS score; thus, higher total scores indicate broader, 
more inclusive categorization.
Object Sort (SORT). The factor analytic study of Sloane 
et al. ( 1963 ) revealed that all types of object sorting tasks,
including those using both actual objects and written names 
of objects, loaded on a single factor. Clayton and Jackson 
(1961) developed two written object sort tasks, both of which 
loaded as highly on the sorting factor of Sloane et al. as 
did the actual object sort of Gardner et al. (1959). Unfor­
tunately, Clayton and Jackson did not publish their own 
written lists of 50 objects to free-sort. Therefore, for the 
present study, a list of 50 objects was created which met 
their specified criteria (see Appendix B). The score is the 
number of categories created by the examinee which included 
at least two elements.
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Dogmatism (DOG), Ambiguity Tolerance (AMBIG) and Rigidity 
(RIG). The DOG scale requires subject ratings of degree of 
agreement (-3 to +3) with 15 statements, e.g., "Most people 
just don't know what's good for them." For scoring, ratings 
are transposed by addition of the constant +4, to values of 
+1 to +7 (to avoid possible negative sums) and totalled. The 
AMBIG and RIG scales require True-False responses to similar 
items. The 20 AMBIG items are exemplified by, "It bothers 
me when I don't know how other people react to me" (scored if 
"false"). Fifteen of the AMBIG items are scored in the False 
direction, five in the True direction. The 22 RIG items are 
all scored in the True direction and are of the type, "There 
is usually only one best way to solve most problems."
Welsh Figure Preference Test (WFPT). The WFPT (Welsh, 
1980) consists of 400 black and white drawings varying in 
complexity and abstractness. The subject indicates whether 
(s)he "likes" or "does not like" each figure. While scores 
may be determined for over 30 scales of this test, only two 
empirical scales were utilized in the present study. The 
93-item Origence (WOR) scale, which is a refinement of the 
earlier Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Barron, 1953a), is a measure 
of figural complexity preference, while the 69-item Intellec- 
tance (WIN) scale measures degree of preference for abstract 
geometric figures vs. concrete figures. WIN has been inter­
preted as a nonverbal measure of abstract attitude. Theoreti­
cally, the high WOR-low WIN pattern is consistent with a right
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hemispheric cognitive style and the low WOR-high WIN pattern, 
with a left. Thus the score selected to represent the WFPT 
measure was the WOR-WIN difference score (WW). High positive 
or high negative WW scores would thus reflect the "purer" 
types (imaginative vs. intellectual), whereas intermediate 
scores would represent mixed, relatively nonlateralized styles.
Matching Familiar Figures Test (MFFT). The MFFT is a 
measure of reflection vs. impulsivity. The adult form of 
the MFFT requires the examinee to match a stimulus picture 
(which remains in view) to its identical counterpart set 
among seven other highly similar pictures. If an incorrect 
choice is made, the examinee is asked to continue guessing 
until the correct alternative is identified. Two scores are 
derived from the MFFT: the average initial response latency 
(MF-T) for 12 items, and total number of errors (MF-E).
Arithmetic Operations (AO). The AO test is a measure 
of one type of distractibility. The examinee must solve as 
quickly as possible 24 simple arithmetic problems (e.g., "1 +
3 - 2 = ") surrounded by extraneous written material. The 
test is scored for both time required (AO-T) and the number 
of errors (AO-E).
Stroop Color-Word Interference Test (STROOP). As a 
Measure of a second type of distractibility, the STROOP ■
requires inhibition of conflicting verbal cues. First, the 
examinee reads aloud a list of 100 words as quickly as possi­
ble (which consists of the recurring words "red," "blue," and
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"green," all typed in black ink and in irregular order).
Next, the examinee names aloud the "colors of the ink" of 
100 sets of "X" marks, which are typed in red, blue and green 
ink in irregular order. The actual interference test is Part 
3, in which the examinee must again name the "colors of the 
ink," but must "ignore the words that are spelled" (see 
Appendix C). Interference is posed by the fact that the words 
are names of colors incongruent with the ink-color with 
which they are typed, e.g., the word "red" is typed in blue 
ink. Interference scores are obtained for both time required 
to name the colors on Part 3 (ST-T) and total number of 
errors on Part 3 (ST-E).
In addition to the laterality and cognitive style tests, 
two tests of ability were included in the battery. A group- 
administered written form of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale Vocabulary subtest (VOC) (see Appendix D) (Wechsler,
1955) was constructed and used as an estimator of verbal (left 
hemispheric) ability. The Mooney Faces Test (MOON) (Mooney, 
1957), also adapted for group testing (see Appendix E), served 
as an estimator of right-hemispheric ability, as the Mooney 
Test is regarded as a relatively pure measure of the ability 
to synthesize visual information (cf. Benton, 1979).
Additional measures included in the battery because of 
their possible relevance to laterality and cognitive style 
test performance were the Spielberger Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(ANX) (Spielberger, Gorsuch & Lushene, 1970), the MMPI
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controlled Repression-Sensitization scale (CRS) (Handal, 1973), 
and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (SD) (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960).
A summary of all tests included in the battery and the 
variables they purport to measure is given in Table 1.
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Table 1
The Test Battery
Laterality Tests Zenhausern (ZEN)
Verbali zer-Visualizer 
Questionnaire (WQ ) Lateral Eye Movements 
(LEM)
Cognitive Style Tests Group Embedded Figures 
Test (GEFT)
Modified Role Construct Repertory (REP) 
Category Width Scale 
(CWS )
Object Sort (SORT) Dogmatism (DOG) 
Ambiguity Tolerance (AMBIG)
Rigidity (RIG)Welsh Figure Prefer­
ence Test Origence- 
Intellectance (WW) 
Matching Familiar Fig­
ures Test (MFFT) 
Arithmetic Operations 
(AO )Stroop Color-Word 
Interference Test (STROOP)
Ability TestsWAIS Vocabulary (VOC) 
Mooney Faces (MOON)
Additional Tests 
Spielberger Trait Anxiety (ANX) Controlled Repression- Sensitization (CRS) 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (SD)
Measured Variable 
visual (R)"1 vs. nonvisual (~L) 1 
thinkingvisualizer (R) vs. verbalizer 
(L)left-looking (R) vs. right­
looking (L)
field dependence (global) vs.
independence (analytic) 
cognitive simplicity vs. com­
plexitybroad vs. narrow categorization
conceptual differentiation 
open- vs. closed-mindedness 
ambiguity tolerance vs. in­
tolerancecognitive flexibility vs. rigidity imaginative vs. intellectual 
type
impulsivity vs. reflection 
distractibility (Type A) 
distractibility (Type B)
verbal (L) abilityvisual synthesizing (R) ability
trait anxiety
repressor vs. sensitizer
social desirability response 
bi as
i "r 'i refers to presumed right-hemispheric function, "L" to 
left-hemispheric function
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Procedure
Data collection proceeded in three phases. The first 
was a large-scale group screening battery administered to 
right-handed undergraduate volunteers for partial course 
credit as part of an independent study. The screening 
battery consisted of the ANX, ZEN, SD and CRS scales, in that 
order, and required approximately one-half hour of subject 
time. All students taking the screening battery were invited 
at that time to volunteer for participation in the present 
study for additional research credit. In this way, one male 
and 20 female subjects were recruited. All other subjects 
were recruited in conventional sign-up fashion, and these 
students were administered the screening battery at the time 
of the second data-gathering phase.
For the second phase, each participant was seen indivi­
dually by appointment for approximately one hour. Individual 
sessions were conducted by one of four trained, advanced 
undergraduate research assistants. Initially, efforts were 
made to counterbalance (1) number of subjects seen by each 
assistant, (2) approximate time of day of testing by each 
assistant, and (3) subject sex vs. assistant sex. However, 
these efforts were thwarted at an early stage due to gross 
imbalances in assistant availability. Assistant 1 (female) 
tested 16 females and 18 males; Assistant 2 (female) tested 
14 females and 14 males; Assistant 3 (male) tested 14 females 
and 10 males; and Assistant 4 (male) tested 9 females and 3
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males. During the individual sessions, subjects were admin­
istered the screening battery (ANX, ZEN, SD and CRS) if 
necessary, LEM interview, AO, STROOP and MFFT, in that order. 
All test introductions and directions were provided to assis­
tants in written form to be read verbatim. At the conclusion 
of individual testing sessions, subjects were given reminder 
slips specifying the location, date and time of their final 
group testing session, which was scheduled at the same time 
as individual sessions.
All but two (male) subjects who completed the individual 
testing also completed the final group testing. Altogether, 
eight group sessions were held in order to accommodate stu­
dents' schedules, the groups ranging in size from two to 25. 
One female subject who failed to appear for one group session 
and also a subsequently scheduled session did complete the 
study when rescheduled a second time. All group sessions 
were conducted by the writer and each lasted approximately 
three to three and one-half hours. The order of group test 
presentation was invariably as follows: GEFT, MOON, WQ,
VOC, REP, CWS, DOG, AMBIG, RIG, SORT and WFPT. The first 
two tests (GEFT and MOON) were timed tests; the remaining 
tests were untimed and completed at the subjects' own pace. 
Coffee and doughnuts were available to subjects during the 
untimed portion of group sessions, and the taking of breaks 
was encouraged as necessary. The relaxed testing atmosphere 
was intended to encourage optimal cooperation and to minimize
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fatigue. In fact, very few subjects chose to take breaks 
of more than a minute or two, or expressed feelings of fatigue 
at the end of the extensive test battery.
Statistical Analyses
First, t-tests of the mean scores obtained by males and 
females on all variables were computed in order to determine 
whether subsequent analyses should be conducted separately 
by sex. Since sex differences on the laterality and cogni­
tive style measures were minor (to be discussed below), sub­
sequent analyses utilized pooled data (N = 97).
Next, first-order correlations were obtained for all 
variables.
The third step of data analysis consisted of a series of 
multiple regression analyses, utilizing cognitive style test 
scores to predict the composite (LAT) and individual (ZEN,
VVQ, and LEM) laterality measures. While prediction of the 
composite LAT score was of primary interest according to the 
design of the study, separate analyses of the LAT component 
tests were deemed desirable due to low intercorrelations of 
these measures. These separate analyses were thus conducted 
in order to determine whether the cognitive style tests re­
lated in different ways to the various component measures 
of the LAT index. Also, it may be recalled that three of the 
cognitive style tests (STROOP, AO, and MFFT) each yielded two 
different scores, an error score and a time score. The present
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series of analyses and all subsequent analyses were conducted 
twice— first utilizing error-type cognitive style test scores 
for those measures yielding dual scores, and secondly utili­
zing time-type cognitive style test scores. In summary, the 
third step of data analysis consisted of a series of eight 
multiple regression analyses: prediction of LAT, ZEN, WQ, 
and LEM from cognitive style tests including error-type scores, 
and the same predictions from cognitive style tests including 
time-type scores.
The cognitive style test scores were then factor-analyzed 
(principal axis method with oblique rotation). The initial 
factor analysis utilized squared multiple correlations of the 
measures as prior communality estimates. Subsequently, for 
purposes of deriving factor scores, values of 1.0 were used as 
prior communality estimates, thus taking into account the total 
cognitive style test score variance. Cognitive style factor 
scores, of both error (CSF-E) and time (CSF-T) type, were 
generated for each subject. These cognitive style factor 
scores, along with the ability and additional test scores 
(VOC, MOON, ANX, CRS, and SD) were entered as independent 
variables into a series of multiple regression equations, 
with the laterality measures as the dependent variables.
These stepwise regression analyses revealed the degree of 
laterality variance predicted by each variable as well as by 
all variables combined. Again, the analyses were conducted 
separately for the composite (LAT) and individual (ZEN, W Q ,
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and LEM) laterality measures, and separately for the CSF-E 
and CSF-T sets of scores, yielding a total of eight multiple 
regression analyses.
CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS
Sex Differences
The t-test procedure revealed no sex differences on any 
of the laterality measures (ZEN, W Q  and LEM), nor on the 
combined LAT scores.
Of the 14 cognitive style tests, the mean scores of the 
sexes did not significantly differ on 12 (GEFT, REP, DOG, 
AMBIG, RIG, SORT, WW, AO-E, AO-T, MF-E, MF-T, or ST-E). Sig­
nificant mean sex differences were observed only on ST-T (t = 
2.63, £ < .01), showing females to require less time than 
males on the Stroop color-word interference task, and on 
CWS (t = 2.53, £ < .01), indicating females to be narrower 
categorizers than males on the Pettigrew limit-specification 
task.
Males and females did not differ significantly in mean 
scores on either of the ability measures (VOC or MOON). Of 
the additional measures (ANX, CRS, and SD), the sexes differed 
significantly only on mean ANX scores (t = 1.97, £ < .05), 
showing females to score higher than males on Spielberger 
Trait Anxiety.
Intercorrelation of the Measures
The correlation matrix of all variables of the study is 
shown in Table 2.
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix: All Variables'1'
ZEN W Q  LEM GEFT REP CWS DOG AMBIG RIG SORT AO-T AO-E MF-T MF-E ST-T ST-E WW .VOC MOON ANX CRS SD
LAT 64d 74d 50d 26b 02 -07 04 16 00 14 18 04 03 -24a 15 07 09 -22a 05 05 12 00
ZEN -- 35° -13 19 -01 03 -05 28b -11 -05 14 -10 -13 -04 06 -04 01 -17 11 00 -04 18
W O 08 09 10 03 14 05 20a 19a 06 10 07 -26b 02 10 02 -34 C -08 -02 21a 11
LEM — 23a -03 -17 02 -01 -08 10 21a 11 13 -16 2 2a 07 13 07 05 12 04 -25
GEFT — 02 12 -18 07 -10 00 00 -26b -03 -18 06 -04 --10 22a 10 -14 -02 -15
REP — 15 08 09 -09 01 07 11 16 -16 -04 12 21a 03 -02 17 00 -12
CWS — -01 -04 04 -17 -21a 03 -02 09 09 13 -07 14 18 -02 03 -08
DOG — -36C 28b 17 10 07 -02 17 03 01 04 -30b -23a 08 2 7 b-11
AMBIG __ .-41d -06 14 -05 03 -09 09 -04 09 -11 17 00 -14 26
RIG — 07 -15 -06 -22a 07 -06 05 02 -09 -16 -15 30b 07
SORT — -19 -02 13 -14 03 -01 01 -16 -12 05 10 04
AO-T — 08 15 04 4 6d 21a 06 -35C -22a 03 -01 21'
AO-E — -07 12 00 -08 03 -15 08 09 24b 13
MF-T -- -54d 09 -05 --07 -03 05 07 -07 -03
MF-E a < £ .05 — 19 26b 07 -16 -12 08 06 -02
ST-T b < .01 — 38d--02 -18 -21a -0 9 02 17
ST-E £ _ 15 -21a -2 4a 22 'a 19 -04c < . 001WW E — -28b -08 30 D 00 -08
VOC dE < .0001 — 26 b -10 -24b-32
MOON — -01 -25b 05
ANX — -24b -12
CRS —  -22'
^Decimal points are assumed but not shown in the correlation coefficients.
kOo
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The high correlations of LAT with ZEN (r = .64), W Q  (r 
= .74) and LEM (r = .50), all significant at the .0001 level, 
were to be expected since LAT was derived from scores on these 
measures. LAT correlations with individual cognitive style 
test scores were nonsignificant, with the exceptions of GEFT 
(r = .26, p < .01) and MF-E (r = -.24, p < .05). Thus a
right-hemispheric style, operationally defined in terms of 
LAT score, is associated with a more field independent per­
ceptual style (ability to perceptually overcome an embedding 
context) and with fewer errors on the MFFT (ability to iden­
tify identical pictorial stimuli under time pressure). LAT 
correlates negatively with verbal ability as measured by VOC 
(r = -.22, p < .05) but is apparently unrelated to visual 
synthesizing ability (MOON). LAT correlations with the addi­
tional measures (ANX, CRS and SD) were all nonsignificant.
The individual laterality tests correlated with cognitive 
style measures in unique and inconsistent patterns (see Table 
2). None of the individual laterality measures, nor the 
composite LAT score, correlated significantly with seven 
(REP, CWS, DOG, AO-E, MF-T, ST-E, WW) of the 14 cognitive 
style variables, with the MOON ability measure, or with trait 
anxiety.
The strongest intercorrelations among the individual 
cognitive style measures were between time and error scores 
on the MFFT (r = -.54, p < .0001), time and error scores on 
the STROOP (r = .38, p < .0001), AO time and STROOP time (r =
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.46, £ < .001), Ambiguity Tolerance and Rigidity (r = -.41,
£ < .0001), and Ambiguity Tolerance and Dogmatism (r = -.36,
£ < .001).
Multiple Regression Analysis: LAT x Individual Cognitive 
Style Measures
Using first that set of cognitive style test scores which 
included error scores of the STROOP, AO and MFFT, stepwise 
regression analysis revealed that GEFT alone accounted for 
about 7 % of total LAT variance, that GEFT and MF-E jointly 
accounted for 10.5% of LAT variance, and that the best 11- 
variable model found accounted for about 23% of total LAT 
variance. Using the cognitive style test scores which in­
cluded ST-T, AO-T, and MF-T instead of ST-E, AO-E, and MF-E 
as independent variables, the order of entry of the variables 
after GEFT varied, and the best 11-variable model accounted 
for only about 18% of total LAT variance.
Multiple Regression Analyses; Individual Laterality Measures 
x Individual Cognitive Style Measures
The order of entry of individual cognitive style variables 
in multiple regression equations to predict individual later­
ality measures was highly inconsistent, and total proportions 
of variances explained were limited. Eleven-variable pre­
dictions of ZEN accounted for only 12% and 14% of ZEN variance, 
respectively, utilizing cognitive style tests yielding error
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and time scores. For LEM, the corresponding proportions of 
explained variance were 21% and 20%; for W Q , 25% and 15%.
The patterns of relative contributions of the independent 
variables in the regression equations for individual later­
ality measures were dissimilar to those for the composite 
laterality index, with the exception that GEFT was weighted 
most heavily in the prediction of LEM, just as for LAT.
Factor Analyses; Cognitive Style Test Scores
An initial factor analysis (principal axis method), using 
squared multiple correlations as prior communality estimates, 
yielded only one cognitive style factor with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.0. This factor was defined primarily by the 
Dogmatism, Rigidity, and Ambiguity Tolerance measures, all 
with factor loadings in the 50's and accounting for about 10% 
of the variance. The appearance of only one factor by this 
method was attributed to the low intercorrelations of indivi­
dual cognitive style tests. Thus for subsequent factor anal­
yses and derivation of factor scores, values of 1.0 were taken 
as initial communality estimates, thereby taking into account 
total cognitive style test score variance as opposed to the 
more limited shared variance (squared multiple correlations) 
of these measures.
Using unity, then, as initial communality estimates, 
the factor analysis of cognitive style tests including error 
scores yielded five factors with eigenvalues greater than
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1.0. The factor analysis of cognitive style tests including 
time scores also yielded five factors. The matrices of 
factor loadings after oblique rotation (the factor structure 
matrices) for both sets of cognitive style tests are given 
in Table 3.
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Table 3
Cognitive Style Factor Loadings
Factors
Variables KE)1 I (T)2 II(E) II (T) III(E) Ill(T) IV( E) IV(T) V(E) V (T)
GEFT -.19 -.36 .19 .09 .18 -.03 -.70 .36 -.28 -. 31
REP -.05 -.05 .85 .04 .04 .43 .05 .53 .11 .63
CWS .11 .04 .28 -.06 .76 -.06 -.04 .84 .01 -.06
DOG .70 .73 .10 .14 -.15 .20 .32 -.05 .14 .21
AMBIG -.79 -.76 .12 .16 -.10 .00 -.10 -.03 .03 .20
RIG .74 .71 -.13 -.16 .00 -.29 .01 -.07 .11 -.05
SORT .15 .17 .21 -.18 -. 66 .60 .01 -.34 -.08 -.01
WW -.12 -.03 .30 .04 -.28 -.10 .20 -.12 .58 . 81
AO-E .05 — .17 — .10 — .78 — -.12 —
MF-E .18 — -.48 — .34 — .38 — .59 —
ST-E .11 — .01 — .17 — -.09 — .75 —
AO-T — -.10 — .87 — .05 — -.10 — .17
MF -T — -.12 — .21 — .78 — .14 — .04
ST-T — -.05 — .80 — .09 — .10 — -.09
(E) - Set of cognitive style test scores including error (not time) scores on three measures.
(T) = Set of cognitive style test scores including time (not error) scores on three measures.
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Factor I of both sets of cognitive style test scores 
was defined by the DOG, AMBIG, and RIG measures, all with 
loadings in the .70's, and thus appeared to be an "Open vs. 
Closed-Mindedness" factor. It accounted for approximately 
16% of total variance of both types of cognitive style test 
scores.
Factor II differed for the cognitive style tests including 
error (E) scores versus those including time (T) scores. For 
the first group, Factor II was defined primarily by REP (fac­
tor loading .85), but a moderate negative loading of MF-E 
(-.48) also appeared on this factor. Based upon its most 
substantial contributor, however, this factor was called 
"Verbal Complexity vs. Simplicity." Factor II of the second 
(T) set of cognitive style tests was clearly defined by time 
scores on both of the distractibility tests (AO-T, loading 
.87; ST-T, loading .80) and was thus easily interpretable 
as a "Distractibility vs. Nondistractibility" factor.
Factor III of the first (E) type of cognitive style 
tests appeared to be an "Inclusive vs. Exclusive Categorizing" 
factor. For this factor, positive loading of CWS (.76), 
indicative of broader, more inclusive limit-setting on the 
Category Width Scale, was associated with negative loading 
of SORT (-.66), which reflects fewer categories created (and 
thus more inclusive groupings) in the free-sort task. Con­
versely, more conservative, exclusive, or narrower CWS cate­
gorizing was associated with more numerous (and hence
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exclusive) categories created on the SORT task. Factor III 
of the second (T) group of cognitive style tests was less 
easily interpretable, being defined primarily by positive 
loadings on both MF-T (.78) and SORT (.60). Longer response 
latencies on the figure-matching task were thus associated 
with more exclusive SORT groupings (larger numbers of cate­
gories created). This factor thus combined elements of 
reflectiveness in task approach, and a discriminating approach 
to conceptual groupings. It was unrelated, however, to re­
sponse latency on the other two timed tasks, AO and STROOP, 
and so the type of reflectiveness involved did not appear to 
be due to distractibility. Therefore, to avoid any connota­
tions of distractibility, this factor was called "Reflective 
Discrimination vs. Impulsive Nondiscrimination." This inter­
pretation was supported by a moderately positive loading of 
REP on this factor. Greater complexity in ratings of people 
(less redundancy of ratings, or more differentiated percep­
tions of others) was thus associated with the "reflective 
discrimination" pole of this factor. Conversely, more global 
and relatively undifferentiated perceptions of other people 
were associated with the "impulsive nondiscrimination" pole.
GEFT and AO-E defined Factor IV of the first cognitive 
style test group, with loadings of -.70 and .78, respectively. 
This factor thus associated low GEFT accuracy with more AO 
errors, and high GEFT accuracy with fewer AO errors. Ability 
to overcome embedding contexts has been theoretically and
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empirically distinguished from ability to overcome distracting 
contexts in the past, and GEFT accuracy was unrelated to 
either AO-T or ST-T on Factor II(T). Thus the relationship 
apparent in the present factor did not appear to be attribu­
table to distractibility. Possibly, Factor IV(E) tapped 
instead a common underlying non-perceptual ability dimension, 
which may indeed be the very ability factor that tends to 
occasionally contaminate the "purely perceptual" GEFT per­
formance. This ability factor may also partially confound 
the AO test, even though the AO items were deliberately con­
structed to be quite simple and designedly thus unaffected 
by numerical ability. An appropriate name for this hypo­
thesized common underlying ability factor was elusive, but 
it was tentatively designated "Numerical-Analytic Ability" 
in order to most closely reflect its constituent tests. For 
this factor, only one pole was named, because as an ability 
measure, it is presumed to be a "more-or-less" variable as 
opposed to a qualitative continuum.
Factor IV of the second (T) group of cognitive style 
tests was unique and interpretively complex. CWS had the 
highest loading (.84) on this factor, followed by REP (.53), 
with modest contributions by GEFT (.36) and SORT (-.34). It 
was partially reminiscent of Factor III(E), which also had 
positive CWS and negative SORT loadings. However, REP and 
GEFT were noncontributory to that factor (which had been 
called "Inclusive vs. Exclusive Categorizing"). Therefore,
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in addition to the inclusive-exclusive dimension, the present 
factor also contained elements of cognitive complexity and 
perceptual field independence, both of which were associated, 
curiously, with the inclusive direction of this factor. The 
interpretive dilemma was not resolved by limiting considera­
tion to only those tests, CWS and REP, with the highest 
factor loadings. Simultaneous positive loadings on these 
measures is both contraintuitive and contratheoretical. Why 
should a broader, more inclusive limit-setter on the Category 
Width Test also manifest more complex and discriminating 
interpersonal judgments? This curious factor was finally 
named after the single variable of highest loading (CWS), 
viz., "Broad vs. Narrow Bandwidth." The "bandwidth" term 
was chosen vs. "categorization" in order to avoid confusion 
with Factor III(E), and to emphasize that it applies pri­
marily to the CWS variety of category formation, without 
generality to the REP task (except paradoxically).
Factor V(E) was primarily defined by the Stroop error 
score (.75), with moderate additional loadings of MF-E (.59) 
and WW (.58). This pattern was descriptive of a type of 
impulsivity or distractibility associated with preference for 
figural complexity and dislike of simple geometrical forms 
when a more "interesting" alternative visual stimulus was 
available. The contribution of WW, probably the purest 
stylistic preference (vs. ability) measure in the battery, 
suggested that the Stroop and MFFT errors made by individuals
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scoring high on this factor were of a qualitatively different 
type than those scoring low on the "Numerical-Analytical 
Ability" Factor, or high on the "Distractibility" Factor. 
Arithmetic Operations Test error scores were in fact slightly 
negatively loaded on this factor. The type of errors asso­
ciated with high Factor V(E) scores, then, were evident on 
tasks requiring oral or pointing (but not written) responses. 
Considered in conjunction with the contribution of WW, this 
factor was therefore interpreted to reflect a type of spon­
taneity, noncritical in certain task situations, with its 
polar opposite being a critical reflectiveness also associated 
with preference for figural order, simplicity, and symmetry. 
Factor V(E) was named "Noncritical Spontaneity vs. Critical 
Reserve."
Finally, the highest loadings on Factor V(T) were those 
of WW (.81) and REP (.63). This factor appeared to combine 
two different types of cognitive complexity: preference for 
figural or nonverbal complexity, and complexity in inter­
personal perception. High Factor V(T) scorers would thus 
both prefer and impose more differentiated cognitive-percep­
tual stimulus arrays; low scorers would prefer and impose 
more simplified and generalized cognitive-perceptions. In 
order to emphasize the application of this factor to both 
verbal and nonverbal domains, it was named "Cognitive-Per­
ceptual Complexity vs. Simplicity," to distinguish it from 
Factor 11(E), which applied only to the verbal cognitive domain.
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A summary of the ten factors extracted in this series of 
analyses is presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Cognitive Style Factors Types E and T
Type
Factor E T
I Open vs. Closed- 
Mindedness Open vs. Closed- Mindedness
AMBIG -.79 
RIG .74 DOG .70
AMBIG -.76 
DOG .73 RIG .71
II Verbal Complexity vs. Simplicity Distractibility vs. Nondistractibility
REP .85 
(MF-E -.48) AO-T .87 ST-T .08
III Inclusive vs. Exclusive 
Categorizing
Reflective Discrimina­
tion vs. Impulsive 
Nondiscrimination
CWS .76 
SORT -.66 MF-T .78 SORT .60 
REP .43
IV Numerical-Analytical Ability Broad vs. Narrow Band­width
AO-E .78 GEFT -.70 CWS .84 (REP .53)
V Noncritical Spontaneity 
vs. Critical Reserve Cognitive-Perceptual Complexity vs. Simplicity
ST-E .75 MF-E .59 WW . 58
WW .81 REP .63
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Multiple Regression Analyses: LAT x Cognitive Style Factors 
and Additional Measures
Using the error-type cognitive style test factor scores 
(CSF-E), as well as the ability and selected additional test 
scores (VOC, MOON, ANX, SD, and CRS), the best three-variable 
model found to predict the composite LAT score included VOC, 
CSF-E Factor 4 (Numerical-Analytical Ability), and CSF-E Factor 
2 (Verbal Complexity vs. Simplicity), in that order. In 
combination, these variables accounted for approximately 13% 
of LAT variance, and the inclusion of all ten variables in­
creased this explained variance to only about 18%.
The corresponding regression analysis using CSF-T factors 
and additional measures as independent variables resulted in 
a ten-variable model which accounted for only 12% of LAT 
variance. The variables included in the best three-variable 
model were VOC, CSF-T Factor 2 (Distractibility vs. Nondis- 
tractibility), and MOON, which jointly accounted for about 
8% of LAT variance.
Multiple Regression Analyses: Individual Laterality Measures 
x Cognitive Style Factors and Additional Measures
Multiple prediction of the individual laterality measures 
from cognitive style factors and additional test scores 
accounted for 11% to 25% of respective laterality variances. 
Prediction from both error and time types of cognitive 
style factors was poorest for the ZEN measure, with total
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explained ZEN variance being 11% and 12%, respectively. The 
best prediction was of W Q  (25%), from CSF-E factor scores 
and additional measures, with the best three-variable solu­
tion including VOC, CSF-E Factor 2 (Verbal Complexity vs. 
Simplicity), and CSF-E Factor 5 (Noncritical Spontaneity vs. 
Critical Reserve). In the multiple regression equation for 
W Q , VOC was negatively weighted, and the factors are weighted 
in the directions of verbal complexity and critical reserve.
CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION
In the following discussion, obtained intercorrelations 
of the individual measures will first be considered, and 
compared with results of previous studies where applicable. 
Next, sex differences will be addressed. Finally, the cog­
nitive style factors and their relation to the laterality 
index will be discussed, with consideration of some general 
procedural and theoretical issues and implications for future 
research.
Dogmatism, rigidity, and ambiguity tolerance all corre­
lated significantly with each other, at the .01 level or 
better, as expected on the basis of previous studies. In 
fact, the obtained correlation coefficient of -.41 (p < .0001)
between rigidity and ambiguity tolerance is of precisely the 
same magnitude as that reported by MacDonald (1970). While 
these three tests were clearly related to each other, none 
of them correlated significantly with any other cognitive 
style variable, with the exception of rigidity, which was 
related to MFFT time score (r = -.22, |D < .05). Higher 
rigidity scores were thus associated with greater impulsi- 
vity, at least in terms of response latency (but not in 
terms of errors). With regard to the ability measures, only 
dogmatism showed any significant relationship, and this rela­
tionship was negative with both verbal and nonverbal ability. 
DOG, RIG, and AMBIG were all unrelated to trait anxiety, but
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both DOG and RIG were significantly related to sensitizing 
on the CRS scale. Dogmatism has previously been related to 
sensitizing (Vacchiano et al., 1969), so this finding is 
consistent with the literature. Also consistent, even though 
somewhat surprising, is an apparent lack of relationship 
between dogmatism and social desirability. High-dogmatics 
have been clearly shown to be a conventional, conservative, 
conforming type, unusually dependent upon authority figures 
and perceived environmental expectations, in a variety of 
tasks and settings. Of all the cognitive style variables 
in the battery, in fact, dogmatism might be expected to re­
late most clearly to a social desirability response bias on 
rational, if not empirical, grounds. Yet, not only was this 
relationship not evident, but ambiguity tolerance correlated 
positively with social desirability (r = .26, p < .01) in
the present sample, contrary to the findings of MacDonald 
(1970). Apparently, high-dogmatics "believe what they be­
lieve" regardless of the social desirability of doing so, 
whereas those who profess tolerance of uncertainties, alter­
native views, challenging problems without clearcut answers, 
and so forth, may in fact be doing so partly because of an 
expectation that this is socially desirable behavior. Alter­
natively, genuinely ambiguity tolerant individuals may be 
"right-brained," visual thinkers (AMBIG was the only cogni­
tive style variable to significantly correlate, positively, 
with the ZEN), whose higher social desirability scores may
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be interpreted as "image-polishing," in the terms of Bear and 
Fedio (1977) .
The Origence-Intellectance (WW) cognitive style variable 
related to some other variables in the battery in expected 
or plausible ways. The so-called "imaginative type" of indi­
vidual, defined by figural complexity preference and avoidance 
of regular, geometric designs, also demonstrates a complex 
(differentiated) personal constructs system, as measured by 
the REP. In fact, WW was the only cognitive style variable 
to significantly correlate with REP. Although it may not be 
surprising to observe a relationship between cognitive com­
plexity and complexity preference, it is interesting that 
this "complexity" dimension applies to a certain extent to 
both verbal and nonverbal modes. WW was also significantly 
negatively correlated with the verbal IQ estimator (VOC), 
which is consistent with Welsh's (1980) claim that the high 
WOR-low WIN type does worst on traditional IQ measures, 
whereas the opposite type does best. Higher WW scores were 
also associated with higher trait anxiety, which is consis­
tent with the literature involving the Barron-Welsh Art Scale 
(BWAS). Welsh (1980) had reported "breakdown of repression" 
and sensitizing tendencies associated with this scale, and the 
writer (Note 1) had found a significant positive relation­
ship between the BWAS and Spielberger trait anxiety. Simi­
larly, the EEG studies of Martindale (1975) had indicated 
relatively high bilateral arousal among "high creatives"
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in the resting state, and various other manifestations con­
gruent with sensitization and/or trait anxiety. Thus the 
significant correlations of WW with other variables in the 
study were sensible; the more perplexing findings in regard 
to WW were the absence of certain expected relationships.
From the foregoing discussion, one such expected relationship 
was obviously with sensitizing tendency on the CRS scale.
This was nonexistent (r = .00). Other expected relationships 
were with impulsivity (positive) and dogmatism (negative), 
based upon Welsh's review of the BWAS, and with rigidity 
(negative), based upon the writer's preliminary study noted 
above. Possibly, these effects were attenuated due to the 
contribution of WIN subscale performance, instead of heightened, 
as proposed by Welsh.
Due to the substantial accumulated literature regarding 
field independence, a number of relationships could be anti­
cipated. Generally, however, only the expected "non-rela­
tionships," as opposed to positive or negative ones, were 
borne out in the present study. Specifically, field indepen­
dence was expected to be independent of the SORT measure (as 
per Gardner et al., 1959), and of dogmatism, rigidity, and 
ambiguity tolerance (Goldstein & Blackman, 1978; Messick & 
Fritzky, 1963). These variables were indeed unrelated to 
GEFT in the present study. However, field independence could 
be expected to correlate negatively with impulsivity, STROOP 
interference score, and possibly the Mooney Faces test (cf.
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Kogan, 1 9 7 1 ), and positively with cognitive complexity (per 
Witkin's "psychological differentiation" theory). None of 
these relationships were apparent. The only variables with 
which GEFT correlated significantly in the present study 
were the Verbal IQ estimator (r = .2 2 , £ < .0 5 ) and Arith­
metic Operations errors (r = -.2 6 , £ < .0 1 ). This finding 
was obtained even though VOC and AO-E were unrelated to each 
other. While Witkin maintains that field independence is 
independent of verbal intelligence, this assertion has not 
always been supported in the past (cf. Kogan, 1 9 7 3 ; Wachtel, 
1 9 6 8 ) and it is not supported in the present study. That 
field independence is associated with fewer errors on the 
distractibility task also calls into question Karp's (1 9 6 3 ) 
claim that ability to extract relevant information from an 
embedding context is independent of the same skill in a 
distracting context. Furthermore, Karp had reported fac­
torial independence of the Arithmetic Operations test and 
WAIS Vocabulary, but in the present study, the AO time score 
was correlated (negatively) with both ability measures.
Thus, lower verbal and visual synthesizing ability scores 
were associated with longer time required to perform the AO 
distraction test, and more errors on the embedded figures 
test; and more GEFT errors were also associated with more 
AO errors. The rather low (but significant) pattern of 
obtained intercorrelations would support the notion that 
GEFT field independence and AO freedom from distractibility
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are related but not identical abilities, that neither of them 
are completely independent of verbal intellectual ability, 
and that AO distractibility is also related in part to lower 
visual synthesizing ability.
What of the other type of distractibility, the type 
measured by the Stroop test? Previous factorial studies had 
suggested that the STROOP and AO tests tap different cogni­
tive domains. But in the present study, both STROOP time and 
error scores were significantly related to AO time (but not 
AO error) scores. In fact, the correlation between STROOP 
time and AO time (r = .46, £ < .0001) was the strongest 
observed interrelationship between any pair of different 
cognitive style tests. Individuals who require more time on 
the color-word interference test (and who make more errors 
in the process ) also tend to require more time to solve simple 
arithmetic problems in a highly distracting context. The in­
dependence of these two types of distractibility is thus 
questionable. Also, Stroop time and errors appear to be 
negatively related to both verbal and visual synthesizing 
ability (three of the four correlations involved were signi­
ficant). Perhaps the most surprising finding with the STROOP, 
however, was its apparent lack of relationship to field inde­
pendence. Gardner et al. (1959) had found more field dependent
subjects to be more susceptible to Stroop interference, at 
least among females (the obtained correlation of .21 for 
males in that study was nonsignificant with consideration of
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sample size). The failure to replicate this finding with the 
present sample is all the more puzzling due to observed asso­
ciations between the STROOP and AO, AO and GEFT , and between 
all three of these measures with the ability measures. Given 
these, we would also expect a STROOP relationship with GEFT. 
But this relationship was very nearly zero. Apparently, the 
facility to inhibit a verbal cue (as required by the STROOP) 
bears some relationship to speed and accuracy in extracting 
and working with numerical information (the AO), inhibiting 
extraneous material, but it is unrelated to perceptual analy­
sis, requiring the disembedding of a geometric figure. The 
difference may thus possibly be explained in terms of task 
content (verbal/numerical vs. visuospatial) or in terms of 
the primary task demand (inhibition vs. active analysis).
Expected relationships involving the reflection-impul- 
sivity (MFFT) test were highly tentative, since the relevant 
prior studies had all been done with children. Reflective 
children had been found to be more field independent, with 
MFFT time scores relating positively to EFT accuracy and 
MFFT error scores relating negatively to EFT accuracy. With 
the present sample of college students, these relationships 
were not apparent. Correlations of MF-T and MF-E with the 
GEFT were nonsignificant. We are reminded of Wachtel's (1968) 
distinction between style and capacity, especially as this 
relates to child-adult differences in analytic functioning. 
While Wachtel had confined his discussion to analytic ability
Ill
(field independence) vs. analytic style (as measured by a 
sorting task), finding these to be related in children but 
not necessarily in adults, his reasoning may be applicable 
to the current topic. That is, a reflective task approach 
may well be an ability or capacity dimension in children, 
thus related positively to EFT accuracy. But in adults, 
reflection-impulsivity (or "cognitive tempo") may represent 
more of a stylistic dimension, not necessarily related to 
GEFT ability. This interpretation is supported by the ob­
servation that while the GEFT positively correlates with the 
verbal ability measure even in adults, the MFFT bears no 
relation to either ability measure.
Not surprisingly, longer initial response latencies on 
the MFFT were clearly and negatively related to MFFT errors 
(r = -.54, p < .0001). MFFT errors were also positively 
associated with STROOP errors (r = .26, £ < .01). Of some­
what greater interest, longer MFFT response latencies also 
correlated with lower Rigidity scores (r = -.22, £ < .05).
A reflective task approach thus appears associated to some 
degree with greater cognitive flexibility. The previous 
speculation, that reflectiveness may represent more of a 
stylistic than an ability dimension in adults, is indirectly 
supported by its association with rigidity, which also was 
unrelated to either ability measure in the present study.
The conceptual differentiation (SORT), category width 
(CWS), and cognitive complexity (REP) measures yielded the
112
most disappointing results of the study, with the exception 
of the REP relationship to figural complexity preference 
discussed earlier. These three dimensions did not show any 
relationship to each other or to any other variable in the 
study, except for weak relations between SORT and the W Q  (r 
= .19, £ < .05) and between CWS and AO-T (r = -.21, £ < .05). 
These isolated relationships make little theoretical sense 
and may easily be chance findings. The large number (39) of 
potential significant intercorrelations of these measures 
with each other and with other cognitive style variables could 
have provided an excellent basis for emergence of an antici­
pated "complexity-differentiation" cognitive style factor. 
Therefore, while the apparent independence of these dimensions 
in 37 of 39 of these comparisons is impressive in its own 
right, this very independence substantially doomed hope of 
extracting a cognitive style factor of this type.
Of the cognitive style variables, findings of some prior 
studies led to expectation of sex differences on the GEFT 
(males more field independent), and the MFFT (females more 
reflective). In the present sample, the mean scores of males 
and females did not significantly differ on either of these 
measures. Also, the occasionally reported superior vocabulary 
scores of females were not evident in the present study. 
Despite prior findings of higher quantitative facility among 
males than females, the sexes in the present study did not 
differ in performance on the distraction task involving
113
numerical content. The sexes did differ on the CWS, as re­
ported in prior studies, with females manifesting narrower 
categorization. Females also obtained significantly higher 
trait anxiety scores. Despite these isolated observed 
differences, the more prominent findings of the present 
study in regard to sex differences were (1) absence of several 
expected differences, and (2) the large number of no observed 
sex differences. These findings support the observation of 
Kogan (1976), and more recently, of Hyde (1981), that sex- 
related cognitive differences may typically be overstated 
in the literature and may even be declining over time. The 
implication of such findings and observations, is not that 
investigators should fail to seek sex differences, or to re­
port or control for them when observed, but rather that they 
not be inappropriately exaggerated, assumed, or otherwise 
utilized in ways which serve to foster sexual discrimination 
in real-life settings such as school guidance or career 
counseling (cf. Hyde, 1981). Such implications and appli­
cations go "far beyond the data."
The cognitive style factors extracted in the current 
study accounted for very little more of the total cognitive 
style test variance than did any single cognitive style test 
score. This is not surprising, in view of the low inter­
correlations of individual cognitive style tests. The first 
and largest factor (and the only one with an eigenvalue 
greater than 1.0 in the factor analysis using squared multiple
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correlations as initial communality estimates), was an "open 
vs. closed-mindedness" factor defined by Dogmatism, Rigidity, 
and Ambiguity Tolerance, which demonstrated the most consis­
tent individual intercorrelations. Additional factors, 
generated by the factor analytic procedure in which total 
cognitive style test variance instead of shared variance was 
considered, were different depending upon whether time or 
error scores were used for those tests which yielded both 
types of scores. Other than the tests which loaded on Factor 
1 (DOG, RIG, and AMBIG), even those tests which did not yield 
dual scores did not load on comparable factors in the second 
series of factor analyses. Thus, it would appear that only 
Open vs. Closed-Mindedness is a factor which emerges reliably, 
regardless of the method used. However, it should be recalled 
that even this reliable first factor only accounted for up to 
7% more total variance (depending upon the type of factor 
analytic method used) than any of its individual component 
tests, so that its theoretical as well as practical signi­
ficance is very limited.
Similarly, the multiple regression analyses revealed 
that a relatively small amount of laterality test variance 
was predictable from cognitive style tests, cognitive style 
factors, and additional measures. Unexplained composite 
LAT variance ranged from 77% to 88% with maximum R^ predic­
tion; unexplained individual laterality test variance ranged 
from 75% to 89%. Furthermore, the patterns of relative
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contributions of independent variables in these analyses were
inconsistent, among individual laterality tests and between
individual and composite laterality measures.
Generally, we might draw conclusions from the present
study similar to those of Gardner et al. (1959), from theirs:
Perhaps the most salient new finding of the present 
study is that these control principles are indepen­
dent of each other . . . This is an important finding.
It implies that it is necessary to sample the various 
controls in a person's cognitive behavior if we are to understand his "cognitive style." This is parti­
cularly true since even the simplest-appearing adap­
tive behaviors may involve more than one cognitive factor. (pp. 137-138)
While the inclination to simplify and to generalize, and to 
infer some cognitive characteristics of people on the basis 
of others, is both natural in everyday interaction and a goal 
of scientific psychological theory, studies such as the current 
one should loudly caution against such inclinations. We 
might, as suggested by Gardner, confine our inquiries to a 
"variable by variable" assessment of an individual's multi­
dimensional cognitive style, predicting with confidence only 
from a mosaic cognitive style profile, which in a way repre­
sents an abandonment of the search for higher-order, unifying 
theoretical principles.
Or, we might conclude, like Corballis (1980), that the
search for unifying principles of cognitive style is not
unreasonable or unrealistic; but that the neuropsychological
model itself is inadequate to the task:
My quarrel is not with the classification of cognitive 
styles that has been grafted onto the left-right axis.
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It is perfectly acceptable to contrast intuition 
with reason, the holistic with the analytic, the 
appositional with the propositional . . . What I 
am objecting to is the simplistic notion that 
these contrasting cognitive styles are identified 
with the two cerebral hemispheres. (p. 288)
The major problem with Corballis' argument, however, is that 
until only about twenty years ago, differential hemispheric 
capabilities other than localization of speech and language 
function were unknown. Before that, the idea that the right 
hemisphere can perceive and copy geometric figures while the 
left, in isolation, cannot, that objects presented to the 
right hemisphere could be correctly identified nonverbally 
while the left hemisphere concurrently verbally denies their 
very existence, would also have seemed incredible and perhaps 
simplistic. Yet this is well-documented fact, and the impli­
cations of these and other differential functions have only 
begun to be explored. To reject the relevance of these 
structural and functional differences to cognitive style—  
information processing in the normal brain— seems premature 
at best. The two brain hemispheres do appear to process 
different information, in different ways, and that is what 
the construct of "cognitive style" is all about.
We would agree with Corballis that over-hasty, sweeping 
inferences about left-right hemispheric differences in 
everyday behavior are also premature and inappropriate. As 
Ley (1979) has noted, "The behavioral manifestations of 
functional cerebral asymmetries in man embody a current 
psychological Zeitgeist" (p. 41). "Split-brain psychology"
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has indeed been dubbed the "fad of the year" (Goleman, 1977). 
Articles abound in the popular press (e.g., Loch, 1981; 
Raudsepp, 1981) which grossly exaggerate known behavioral 
correlates of left vs. right hemispheric function. Such 
exaggerations and distortions are naturally an affront to 
serious investigators and do little but provide "bad press" 
for neuropsychological models of behavior. They are reminis­
cent of the explosion of speculative material and applications 
which followed introduction of psychoanalytic concepts early 
in the present century. However, just as "popular analysis" 
is irrelevant to the validity or invalidity of psychoanalytic 
theory, popular notions of "hemisphericity" in all areas of 
life and civilization need not and should not detract from 
or discourage scientific investigation of the laterality 
model.
The present study does offer implications for future re­
search in this area. For one, the observed intercorrelations 
among the three "laterality" measures were very low, suggesting 
the need for improvement of the measurement of laterality in 
nonclinical settings. The LEM measure did not correlate 
significantly with either the ZEN or the W Q , so that it is 
doubtful that the LAT index was much more than self-reported 
visual, modality preference. While this preference may even­
tually prove to be related to a degree to a right-hemispheric 
processing style, it is probably not identical with it. Thus 
one major implication of the study is that more sophisticated
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measures of laterality in normal subjects need to be developed. 
Secondly, the "cognitive style variables" of the present study 
were a potpourri of tests, many apparently measures of ability 
as opposed to style, developed within various theoretical 
frameworks. It would seem that, to assess cognitive style 
from a neuropsychological viewpoint, measures of dimensions 
of cognitive style must be developed which are based soundly 
upon neuropsychological research. Validation of these measures 
against real-life problem-solving strategies would follow.
The present study has offered evidence that several 
existing "laterality" measures are largely unrelated to a 
number of traditional cognitive style measures. The cogni­
tive style dimensions in turn were found to be largely inde­
pendent of each other, indicating that individuals manifest 
considerable diversity in their cognitive styles as they are 
presently measured, and that in fact the term "cognitive 
style" may be misleading in its implications of unity and 
consistency. Future efforts to investigate the relationship 
between laterality and cognitive style might best begin with 
refinement of assessment techniques in both domains.
APPENDICES
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LEM Introduction
"I'm going to ask you some questions, and I want you
to consider your answers carefully."
LEM Questions 1234567890
1. Envision the keyboard of a typewriter. In which corner 
of the keyboard is the letter "P"?
2. Tell me how you feel when you are anxious.
3. What is meant by the proverb, "One today is worth twotomorrows? "
4. Visualize and describe the most upsetting photograph of the Vietnam war that you have seen.
5. What is the primary difference between the meanings of 
the words "mischief" and "malice"?
6. Make up a sentence using the words "code" and "mathe­matics . "
7. If you were crossing a street from west to east, and a
car coming from the south smashed into you, which leg
would be shattered first?
8. Imagine a rectangle. Draw a line from the upper left 
hand corner to the lower right hand corner. What two figures do you now have?
9. Imagine that you are relaxing in hot sulfur baths looking westward over the Pacific Ocean in California on a clear, sunny day. Your friend is peacefully resting with his
back toward your right side. Approximately what direction is your friend looking out over?
10. Visualize the Prudential Tower in Boston and the United Nations building in New York and tell me which one is taller.
11. Make up a sentence using the words "shock" and sadness."
12. What is the primary difference between the meanings of the words "recognize" and "remember"?
Appendix A. The LEM Questionnaire
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13. For you, is anger or hate a stronger emotion?
14. Envision walking through your house or apartment and 
tell me how many doors there are.
15. Picture the last automobile accident that you have seen. 
In which direction were the cars going?
16. Do you use the word "logical" or "rational" more often?
17. What is meant by the proverb, "The more cost, the more honor?"
18. When you visualize your father's face, what emotion 
first strikes you?
19. On the face of a quarter, does the face of George Washing 
ton look to the left or right?
20. Tell me how you feel when you are frustrated.
Appendix B. The Object Sort Test
Below you will find a list of the names of 50 common ob­jects. Your task is to PUT TOGETHER INTO GROUPS THE OBJECTS 
WHICH SEEM TO YOU TO BELONG TOGETHER. In the space below (and continued on the back of this page if necessary) , write 
down the list of objects in each group, LABELING each group with a name or phrase which describes the way in which they 
belong together. Use each object only once; that is, do not place any single object in more than one group.
YOU MAY CREATE AS MANY OR AS FEW GROUPS as you like, and 
you may have as many or as few objects in a group as you like, as long as the objects in each group belong together 
for a particular reason. If, after you have thought about 
all the objects, a few do not seem to belong with any of the 
others, you may put those objects into groups by themselves. 
PLEASE SORT ALL THE OBJECTS.
Sandpaper
Bicycle bellThimble
PebbleSugar cube
SpoonComb
Toy hammer
Bow tie
Sponge
CrayonBar of soap
Light bulbLipstick
DimeFork
Button
CigaretteDoll
Padlock/Key 
Medicine dropper 
Picture postcard Paper clip 
Cologne
Ping pong ball 
White chalk Fishing fly 
Hairpin Nail
Postage stamp
CandleLollipop
Earring
Screwdriver
Suntan oil 
Deck of cards 
Wrench Cigar
Paperback book Penny
Sunglasses 
Butter knife 
Hairbrush 
Golf ball 
Spool of thread 
Pocket knife Vitamin pill Typewriter ribbon Watercolor set 
Pencil
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(Words, Page 1) "This is a test of how fast you can read
the words on this page. After I say begin, 
you are to read down the columns, starting 
with the first column, reading the words OUT LOUD as quickly as you can. After you 
finish the first column, go on to the next and so on until you reach the end. If you 
make a mistake, correct it and go on. Any 
questions? Then begin."
Appendix C. Stroop Test Directions
(Colors, Page 2) (Same as above, except say "colors of the
ink" instead of "words".)
(Colors-Words, "This is a test of how fast you can read
Page 3) the colors of the ink on this page, ignoring
the words that are spelled. Remember to 
read the colors OUT LOUD, and read the 
columns as quickly as you can. Again, if 
you make a mistake, correct it and go on. Ready? Begin."
Appendix D. The Vocabulary Test
"Please write a brief but complete definition of the following 
words. If you do not know a word, you may skip the item, although you are encouraged to attempt all the items (there 
is no penalty for guessing). Please do not write in the column marked 1X 1."
[Words presented are Items 4-40 of the WAIS Vocabulary sub­
test. In scoring, full credit is assumed for Items 1-3.]
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Appendix E. Mooney Test Directions and Answer Format
The figures you are about to see are all human faces, and they are all right side up. The numbered items below refer 
to the numbers of the figures in the accompanying booklet.
Your task is to describe the face by placing an (x) next to 
the most correct word in each of the following categories: 
SEX (Male, Female), AGE (Child, Adult, Aged), and DIRECTION 
FACING (e.g., left, right, up, down, etc.). Rate the direc­tion facing according to your own perspective— your right or 
left, etc.--and not according to the perspective of the face 
in the picture.
If you are unable to see a figure within a few seconds, skip 
it and return to it later.
[The answer sheet is of the following form, for the series 
of 24 test stimuli presented separately in a booklet:]
SEX AGE DIRECTION FACING
1 . M Child RightF Adul t Straight outAged Up
2. M Child Left
F Adult UpAg ed Rig ht
[items are counted correct only if the sex, age, and direction 
facing choices are correct.]
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